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THE ARKANSAS TRUST CODE: GOOD LAW FOR ARKANSAS
Lynn Foster*
I. INTRODUCTION
The trust is a legal entity whereby a settlor splits the "bundle of sticks"
of property ownership into two bundles-responsibility and enjoyment-
and transfers them to two persons-the trustee and the beneficiary. Extolled
as a way to avoid probate, creditors, and taxes, the trust is a remarkably
flexible means to a variety of ends. Trusts have never been more popular.'
Notwithstanding the wide use of trusts, the trust law in many states is a
patchwork comprised of statutes covering only selected areas of trust law
and cases determining the law merely with regard to the narrow issues in
dispute.2 This has definitely been the case in Arkansas, which until now has
had no comprehensive trust code. It could be argued that this lack of trust
law had its advantages-trust drafters and trustees could perhaps exercise
more flexibility and creativity. But these advantages were outweighed by
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School
of Law. The author thanks the following reviewers of earlier drafts of this article: Richard
Atkinson, Lawrence H. Averill, William Haught, Sharon Reece, and Tom Womack, with
special thanks to Professor Scott Stafford. Thanks are also due to Jian Hang and Stella Phil-
lips for their research assistance. Finally, she is grateful to the editors and staff of the Law
Review for their cooperation and willingness to accept last-minute changes as the bill was
amended. Any errors are her own.
1. Unfortunately, there are no statistics to conclusively prove this claim. In most states
trusts are not recorded or filed, unlike deeds and probated wills. However, the American
Association of Retired Persons estimates that as of 1999 twenty-three percent of Americans
aged fifty or over had a living trust, up from 1991, when only twelve percent of persons
forty-five or over reported having a living trust. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED
PERSONS, WHERE THERE IS A WILL 4 (2000), http://research.aarp.org/econ/will.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 21, 2004). See also the estimate that between 1998 and 2052 at least $41 trillion
will pass between generations in the United States, much of it in trust form. John J. Havens
& Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: A Review
of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLAN., Jan. 2003, at 11-15, 47-50,
http://www.bc.edu/research/swri/meta-elements/pdf/41 trillionreview.pdf (predicting a
"golden age" of philanthropy despite the downturn of the financial markets in the first half of
this decade) (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
2. A number of states do have trust codes. See, e.g., California, Florida, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Montana, New York, Texas, and Washington. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15000B18201
(West 1991 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 737.101-627 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-12-1 to 53-12-394 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§
30-1-1-9 to 30-5-10-4 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.1101-7101
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-101 to 72-33-705 (2003) N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 7-1.1 to 7-5.7 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2005); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 111.001-115.017 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2004-2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
11.98.009-920 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
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the drawbacks of inconsistency and uncertainty, preventing settled expecta-
tions of settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries.
To remedy this problem, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)
in 2000.3 At this writing, nine states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted the UTC. Arkansas is the latest addition, having enacted the UTC,
retitled as the Arkansas Trust Code (ATC), on March 21, 2005.5
This article seeks to provide guidance to Arkansas practitioners and
judges working with the ATC. Part I relates the history of the UTC, its rela-
tion to existing law and its review by the Arkansas Bar Association, and
provides an overview. Part II discusses the ATC and reproduces pertinent
sections in the footnotes. The article discusses Arkansas's changes to the
UTC text and compares and contrasts the ATC with current Arkansas trust
law. For convenience a brief description of current Arkansas trust law stat-
utes is included at the end of the article. A caveat should be inserted here.
This article is not a substitute for reading the ATC and-just as important-
the accompanying commentary provided by the NCCUSL.6 Finally, some
3. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2003), 7C U.L.A. 442 (Supp. 2004) [hereinafter
UTC]. The text of the Uniform Trust Code, including comments, can be viewed at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm, which is the URL of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Site. Viewers should take care that they are looking
at the desired version of the Code because it was subsequently amended in 2001, 2003, and
2004. Probably the most helpful site, however, is the UTC Project website at
http://www.utcproject.org. This website contains the text of the UTC, a list of the enacting
states, and a semi-annual newsletter, among other features.
4. Jurisdictions that have enacted the UTC are the District of Columbia, Kansas,
Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1301.01-1311.03 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
Sa-101 to 58a-1106 (Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, §§ 101-1104 (Thompson
Supp. 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 456.1-101-456.11-1106 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg.
Sess. of 92d Gen. Assembly (2004); NEBR. REv. STAT. §§ 30-3801-30-38110 (LEXIS Supp.
2004); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 564-B:1-101 to 564-B:11-1104 (LEXIS Supp. 2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46A-1-101 to 46A-1 1-1104 (Thompson 2003 & Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-15-101 to 35-15-1103 (Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-7-101 to 75-7-1201
(LEXIS Supp. 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-101 to 4-10-1103 (LEXIS 2003). Arizona
enacted the UTC in 2003 but repealed it in 2004.
5. An Act to Adopt the Arkansas Trust Code, Act. No. 1031 (Mar. 21, 2005) (to be
codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-101-28-73-1105). Acts are available online at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
6. Commentary is most helpful when it is printed accompanying the statutes. Hereto-
fore all commentary concerning Arkansas's uniform laws has been printed in two separate
"Commentaries" volumes of the official Arkansas Code Annotated published by LexisNexis.
Unfortunately, these volumes have not been updated since 1995, leaving the Arkansas bench
and bar without access to NCCUSL commentary through its official state code. The author
hopes that if the ATC is enacted we will see the statutes and commentary side by side in Title
28, as they are currently displayed in West's Arkansas Code Annotated. Other sources of the
NCCUSL commentary are the NCCUSL website at
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portions of the UTC, either because they have caused unforeseen tax ramifi-
cations or because they represent clear policy preferences on the part of the
UTC drafters, have engendered controversy or have been amended by a
significant number of the enacting states. This article endeavors to point out
the sections in question that are relevant to the ATC.
II. THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE
A. The Adoption and Relation of the UTC to Other Uniform Laws
In the words of the drafters, the UTC is "the first national codification
of the law of trusts."7 Prior uniform acts have affected trusts, but none have
dealt comprehensively with trust law. Two previously existing uniform laws
are effectively superseded by the UTC: the Uniform Trusts Act 8 and the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act,9 neither of which were enacted by Arkan-
sas. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which was adopted by Arkansas in
1997,10 is "reincorporated" as part of Article 8 and all of Article 9 of the
UTC, and has been retained in this way as part of the ATC. Finally, the
UTC supersedes most of Article VII of the Uniform Probate Code," dealing
with the powers of trustees. Arkansas has not adopted the Uniform Probate
Code. A number of other uniform laws adopted by Arkansas concern trusts
but are not affected in any way by the UTC.12 A third uniform law, The
Uniform Principal and Income Act (enacted in Arkansas in 1999),13 together
with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the UTC, comprise a compre-
hensive code of trust law.
B. The Relation of the UTC to the Restatements
Restatements of Law are promulgated by the American Law Institute
(ALl) in an attempt to provide summaries of the law (or in some cases, what
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc final.htm, Uniform Laws Annotated and Westlaw.
7. UTC prefatory note.
8. UN,'. TRUSTS Act, 7C U.L.A. 388 (2000).
9. UNIw. TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT, 7C U.L.A. 401 (2000).
10. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-51-200-23-51-211 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1,
2005). In other words, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act has moved from Title 23 to Title 28
of the Arkansas code.
11. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. Pt. 11486 (1998 & Supp. 2004).
12. They are: the Unif. Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-
201-28-2-218; the Unif. Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, id. §§ 28-27-101-28-27-106;
the Unif. Management of Institutional Funds Act, id. §§ 28-69-601-28-69-611; and the Unif.
Custodial Trust Act of 1987, id. §§ 28-72-401-28-72-422. These acts are summarized in the
Appendix.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-70-101-28-70-605.
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the ALL believes should be the law) in particular areas for the benefit of
legislators, judges, and practitioners. Less than a year after the passage of
the UTC, the ALl promulgated the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. The UTC
drafters worked in close cooperation with the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts to such an extent that the UTC Reporter has stated that "a
significant minority, if not majority, of the UTC provisions could be de-
scribed as a codification of the Restatement."14 Most of the UTC Comments
cite the Restatements (Third) and (Second). In other words, the UTC and
the Restatement (Third) are a companion set, the former for legislative
adoption and the latter for judicial adoption on a case-by-case basis. In Ar-
kansas, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, promulgated in 1957, has long
been followed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.'5 The Restatement (Third)
is so new that the Supreme Court has not taken any position on it as a
whole, 16 although there is no reason to doubt that most, if not all, of it will
be followed by the court.
C. Review of the UTC by the Arkansas Bar
The UTC was first approved by the Arkansas Bar Association's Uni-
form Laws Committee in 2002. Subsequently it was reviewed by the Juris-
prudence and Law Reform Committee, which referred it to the Probate and
Trust Section for review by practitioners who specialized in trusts. In 2003 a
volunteer ten-person committee (the Study Committee) consisting of past
and present Probate and Trust Section officers, American College of Trust
and Estate Counsel Fellows, and a trust company attorney, among others,
closely reviewed the UTC in light of Arkansas law. The Study Committee
evaluated each section in light of current Arkansas law and revised it where
it was in clear conflict. The revised UTC was submitted to the Probate and
Trust Section in January 2004, which in turn forwarded it to the Jurispru-
dence and Law Reform Committee. One further minor modification 17 was
made at this point, after which the Committee approved it for inclusion in
14. David M. English, The Unifonn Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and
Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. REV. 143, 148 (2002). Professor English was the Reporter for the
Uniform Trust Code.
15. "When reviewing trust cases in Arkansas, we have followed the Restatement Sec-
ond of Trusts." Wisener v. Bums, 345 Ark. 84, 89, 44 S.W.3d 289, 292 (2001).
16. It has cited Section 59 in Med. Park Hosp. v. Bancorpsouth Bank of Hope, No. 03-
1199, 2004 WL 965927 (Ark. May 6, 2004).. One Arkansas Court of Appeals case has also
cited Restatement (Third) of Trusts Sections 10(c) and 16(1) favorably. Trott v. Jones, No.
CA 03-584, 2004 WL 739964 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2004).
17. The Jurisprudence and Law Reform Committee added the definition of "community
property." Letter from William Haught, member, Arkansas Bar Association Probate and
Trust Section Study Committee on the Uniform Trust Code, to Tom D. Womack, Committee
Chair 1 (May 25, 2004) (on file with author).
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the Bar Association's legislative package.' 8 It was approved by the Arkan-
sas Bar Association's House of Delegates in 2004, and in late January 2005
the House of Delegates additionally approved the NCCUSL's 2004 amend-
ments.
D. Enactment by the Legislature
Senator Jim Luker and Representatives Bruce Maloch and Will Bond
sponsored the ATC as Senate Bill 336. It had been amended slightly from
the Bar Association's version before its introduction, but once introduced,
was amended only once in the House of Representatives. These changes are
discussed below. Governor Huckabee signed the bill on March 21, 2005,
whereupon it became Act 1031.
E. Overview of the Arkansas Trust Code
The drafters of the UTC worked with several purposes in mind. The
first was to codify the common law of trusts. 19 The second was to create a
"default statute." Except for a few mandatory rules,2' trust drafters are free
to override the provisions in the ATC and provide their own provisions.22
Finally, the ATC includes some "innovations." Many of these are neu-
tral and work to improve the administration of trusts. Some of them repre-
sent policy decisions of the drafters in such areas as notice to beneficiaries,
rights of creditors against spendthrift trusts, and asset protection trusts.
Some of the enacting states have modified or deleted such provisions. They
are discussed in detail below.
The highlights of the new law contained in the ATC are:
1. The idea of "qualified beneficiaries." 23
2. The definition and regulation of a trust's "principal place of
administration."
24
3. The authorization of out-of-court settlements.25
18. This sequence of events is taken from Tom D. Womack, The Proposed Arkansas
Trust Code, 2004 PROBATE LAW INSTiTUTE 2-3 (Ark. Bar Assoc., 2004).
19. UTC prefatory note.
20. UTC prefatory note.
21. ATC § 28-73-105.
22. UTC § 105 cmt. See also infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing
section 105).
23. ATC § 28-73-103(13)); see infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
24. Id. § 28-73-108; see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
25. Id. § 28-73-111; see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
2005]
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4. The clarification and expansion of the concept of representa-
tion.26
5. The recognition of "honorary trusts" as valid.27
6. The expansion and increased flexibility of the rules for the
modification and termination of irrevocable trusts, including the
28
expansion of the cy pres doctrine.
7. The clarification of the effect of spendthrift and discretionary
trusts on the rights of creditors.29
8. The reversal of the common law presumption of the irrevoca-
bility of a trust.
30
9. The expanded duties of a trustee to account, and the clarifica-
tion of the duties and powers of trustees.
31
10. The clarification of the law of trusts with respect to third per-
sons.
32
11. The partial retroactivity of the ATC.33
III. ARTICLE 1---GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1 covers the scope of the ATC, definitions, default provisions
not subject to override, and other basic provisions such as the governing law
of a trust and the jurisdiction whose law will govern a trust.
26. Id. §§ 28-73-301-28-73-305; see infra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
27. Id. §§ 28-73-408-28-73-409; see infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
28. Id. §§ 28-73-410-28-73-417; see infra notes 151-98 and accompanying text.
29. ATC §§ 28-73-501-28-73-507; see infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
30. Id. § 28-73-602-28-73-603; see infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
31. Id. §§ 28-73-801-28-73-817; see infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
32. Id §§ 28-73-1001-28-73-1013; see infra notes 361-87 and accompanying text.
33. Id § 28-73-1105; see infra notes 389-97 and accompanying text.
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A. Scope-Section 10214
The ATC applies to express trusts, whether charitable or non-
charitable, and to any trust required to be administered in the manner of an
express trust. An express trust is created by a settlor who makes a transfer of
property, either inter vivos or testamentary, to a trustee for the benefit of a
beneficiary. The primary focus of the ATC is trusts that arise in a gratuitous
transfer context, including estate planning. However, the drafters intend the
Code to apply to commercial trusts35 as well, such as pension trusts, to the
extent that it is not displaced by other statutes.36 Additionally, the ATC
would also apply to trusts such as those created pursuant to a divorce de-
cree, or trusts created to hold proceeds of personal injury recoveries.17 The
ATC does not pertain to two types of "implied trusts"-resulting trusts and
constructive trusts-which are really not trusts at all but types of judicial
remedies. 38 In addition, the ATC, in an amendment to the UTC, further ex-
cludes "public trusts"-express trusts created with the state or local gov-
ernment as beneficiary-that are regulated by Arkansas statute.
39
34. This section reads as follows:
(a) This chapter applies to express trusts, charitable or noncharitable, and trusts
created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be
administered in the manner of an express trust.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, this chapter does not apply to
public trusts that are governed by §§ 28-72-201-28-72-207.
ATC § 28-73-102.
35. A commercial, or business trust, is "a trust that implements bargained-for exchange,
in contrast to a donative transfer." John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust
as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1997). Professor Langbein provides
a helpful description of the different types of commercial trusts in his article-some exam-
ples are pension trusts and investment trusts-and also clarifies that some misleadingly la-
beled "trusts" are not part of the trust regime at all, such as deeds of trust. See, e.g., First
United Bank v. Phase II, 347 Ark. 879, 894-95, 69 S.W.3d 33, 43-44 (2002) (distinguishing
between a donative trust and a "trust indenture contract," and applying contract law).
36. UTC § 102 cmt.
37. Id.
38. A resulting trust arises in one of the following situations: where a private or charita-
ble trust fails in whole or in part; where a private or charitable trust is fully performed with-
out exhausting the trust estate; and, where property is purchased and the purchase price is
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers the property to another person.
Bottenfield v. Wood, 264 Ark. 505, 509, 573 S.W.2d 307, 309 (1978) (citing the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 404 (1959)). A constructive trust is a legal fiction that is a court's char-
acterization of a relationship between two persons and property for equitable reasons. The
wrongdoer is deemed a constructive trustee by the court and conveys the trust property to the
wronged constructive beneficiary. Betts v. Betts, 326 Ark. 544, 547, 932 S.W.2d 336, 337
(1996).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-72-201-28-72-207 (LEXIS 2004); see City of Barling v.
Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Auth., 347 Ark. 105, 114, 60 S.W.3d 443, 447 (2001) (explain-
ing how the execution of a public trust indenture creates a binding contract).
2005]
UALR LAW REVIEW
B. Definitions-Section 103
Of particular importance are the definitions concerning beneficiaries.
"Beneficiary"0 includes not only beneficiaries under the terms of a trust,
but also those who received their interests by other means, such as assign-
ment, operation of an antilapse statute, or termination of the trust.4' In a
change from the common law, holders of powers of appointmen 2 are now
classified as beneficiaries under the ATC, unless they are holders in the
capacity of trustees.
EXAMPLE: S creates a testamentary trust that benefits his children A
and B. S's wife W has a power of appointment to direct Trustee T to dis-
tribute income to A and B at W's discretion. Under the ATC, W is a
beneficiary. However, if instead, Trustee T was the holder of that power
to appoint the trust property to A and B, T would not be a beneficiary.
Trusts often have beneficiaries whose interests are remote and contin-
gent. One innovation of the ATC is the idea of the "qualified beneficiary.
'A3
40. "In this chapter:...
(3) "Beneficiary" means a person that:
(A) has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contin-
gent; or
(B) in a capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment
over trust property..
ATC § 28-73-103.
41. UTC § 103 cmt.
42. "Power of appointment" is not defined in the ATC. A power of appointment is
authority, other than as an incident of the beneficial ownership of property, to designate
recipients of beneficial interests in property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 11.1 (1986). For tax purposes, powers of appointment can usually be classified
as "general" if they allow the holder of the power to appoint the property to herself, her
creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her estate. I.R.C. §§ 2041(b) & 2514(c) (2000).
"Nongeneral" or "special" powers prohibit appointment to any of the previous four possible
objects. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.4 (1986). For estate
tax purposes, the holder of a general power is usually considered the owner of the property in
question. I.R.C. § 2041. However, if the power is subject to an "ascertainable standard"
(often stated as the "health, education, support or maintenance of the power holder), it will
not be treated as a general power of appointment. I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1).
43. In this chapter:...
(14) "Qualified beneficiary" means a living beneficiary who, on the date the
beneficiary's qualification is determined:
(A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal;
(B) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or
principal if the interests of the distributees described in subdivision (14) (C)
of this section terminated on that date, but the termination of those interests
would not cause the trust to terminate; or
(D) would be a distribtitee or permissible distributee of trust income or
principal if the trust terminated on that date.
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Qualified beneficiaries are those who are "currently eligible to receive a
distribution from the trust together with those who might be termed the
first-line remaindermen.
4 4
EXAMPLE: S creates a testamentary trust. Income will be paid to Wife
W and Children A and B for life at the discretion of Trustee. At their
deaths the trust will terminate and be paid out to the issue of A and B. If
A and B have no issue, then the trust will be paid out to Charity C. At S's
death, if W, A and B are alive, who are qualified beneficiaries?
ANSWER: W, A, B, any living issue of A and B, and C. Permissible dis-
tributees 45 and contingent distributees may be qualified beneficiaries.
EXAMPLE: S creates a testamentary trust. Income will be paid to Wife
W for her life, and after her death, to Children A and B for life, and at
their deaths, to grandchildren. At S's death, if W, A and B and two
grandchildren are alive, who are qualified beneficiaries? ANSWER: W,
A and B. The grandchildren would not receive a distribution if W died,
and so are not "first-line" remaindermen.
The difference between a beneficiary and a qualified beneficiary is im-
portant. Under the ATC, qualified beneficiaries of irrevocable trusts must
receive certain notices, such as notice of a trustee's resignation,46 and may
be asked to give their consent in certain circumstances, such as the modifi-
cation or termination of a trust.47 The Arkansas Attorney General has the
rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to charitable trusts whose prin-
cipal place of administration is Arkansas. 8
ATC § 28-73-103.
44. UTC § 103 cmt.
45. "A permissible distributee" is one whose distribution is discretionary but not manda-
tory. For example, if a trust calls for A to receive a specified monthly income, but for B and
C to receive income only at the discretion of the trustee, B and C are permissible distributees.
46. ATC § 28-73-705.
47. Id. § 28-73-411.
48. Id. Historically, the Arkansas Attorney General has not been active in the enforce-
ment of charitable trusts. The Arkansas Attorney General does not have a statutory duty
imposed by state law to enforce charitable trusts, although the Uniform Institutional Man-
agement of Funds Act, which applies to charitable institutions, requires institutions to notify
the Attorney General if the institution seeks to modify the terms of a charitable disposition
and the donor is unavailable to give consent. The Attorney General has a right to be heard.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-608. With regard to a common law duty, it appears that there is
only one appellate decision in which the Attorney General sued to enforce a charitable trust.
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Van Buren Sch. Dist. No. 42, 191 Ark. 1096, 1102, 89 S.W.2d
605, 607 (1936)(affirming that the Attorney General may file suits to enforce public trusts or
charities).
2005]
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C. Default Rules-Section 10549
The UTC is largely a codification of default rules. Trust drafters have
essentially free range, limited only in a few areas which are listed in section
105 and discussed in its Comment. Some of the default rules that cannot be
drafted away are the requirements for creating a trust;50 certain powers of
courts, including the power to modify or terminate a trust t and to adjust a
trustee's compensation; 52 the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in
accordance with the purposes of the trust;53 the effect of a spendthrift provi-
sion;54 and rights of third parties dealing with the trust.55 Mandatory notice
provisions and limits on exculpatory clauses were removed by the legisla-
ture.
These mandatory rules are discussed below, in the context of the par-
ticular ATC articles in which they occur. Drafters of trust instruments
49. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter governs
the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and
interests of a beneficiary.
(b) The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter except:
(1) the requirements for creating a trust;
(2) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the pur-
poses of the trust;
(3) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its benefi-
ciaries, and that the trust have a purpose that is lawful, not contrary to pub-
lic policy, and possible to achieve;
(4) the power of a court to modify or terminate a trust under 3§ 28-73-410-
28-73-416;
(5) the effect of a spendthrift provision and the rights of certain creditors
and asignees tQ reach a trust as provided in subchapter 5 of this chapter;
(6) the power of a court under § 28-73-702 to require, dispense with, or
modify or terminate a bond;
(7) the power of a court under § 28-73-708(b) to adjust a trustee's compen-
sation specified in the terms of the trust which is unreasonably low or high;
(8) the rights under §§ 28-73-1010-28-73-1013 of a person other than a
trustee or beneficiary;
(9) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding;
(10) the power of a court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction
as may be necessary in the interests of justice; and
(11) the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court for commencing a proceeding
as provided in § 28-73-203.
ATC § 28-73-105.
50. Id. § 28-73-402; see infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.51. Id 33 28-73-410-28-73-416, see infra notes 151-93 and accompanying text.
52. Id. § 28-73-708(b); see infra note 284 and accompanying text.
53. Id. § 28-73-801; see infra note 289 and accompanying text.
54. Id. §§ 28-73-501-28-73-507; see infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
55. Id. §§ 28-73-1010-28-73-1013; see infra notes 375-87 and accompanying text.
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should pay particular heed to these default rules and their accompanying
comments.56
D. Common Law and Equity-Section 106 57
Even a comprehensive code cannot cover all eventualities. The UTC
expressly states that it is supplemented by the common law of trusts and
principles of equity. As possible sources of such principles, the drafters list
the Restatements and the Comments to the UTC.
E. Governing Law of Trusts-Section 10758
This section concerns the law that will govern the meaning and effect
of the trust terms themselves, as distinguished from determining whether a
trust has been validly created,59 or where a suit regarding the trust can be
brought.60 The settlor is free to determine the governing law unless the ju-
risdiction having the most significant relationship to the trust has a strong
public policy against the law of the jurisdiction the settlor chooses. If the
trust is silent, the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant rela-
tionship to the matter at hand will govern. Here, factors such as the location
of the trust property and the domicile of the settlor, trustee, and beneficiar-
ies are important.
61
There is no significant precedent on this issue with respect to trusts:
only one unpublished court of appeals case and two federal court decisions,
one from each district. In two cases, the trust property consisted of land. In
56. The noted authority Professor John Langbein has been the chief proponent of this
idea of trust law as "default law." See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of
Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the
Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 664 (1995) (emphasizing the similarity of trusts to con-
tracts rather than to property).
57. This section reads as follows: "The common law of trusts and principles of equity
supplement this chapter, except to the extent modified by this chapter or another statute of
this state." ATC § 28-73-106.
58. This section reads as follows:
The meaning and effect of the terms of a trust are determined by:
(1) the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the designation of
that jurisdiction's law is contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction
having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue; or
(2) in the absence of a controlling designation in the terms of the trust, the law of
the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue.
ATC § 28-73-107.
59. See id. § 28-73-403.
60. See id. § 28-73-108.
61. UTC § 107 cmt.
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Rainey v. Holland,6 2 the land was located in Mississippi. The testamentary
trust was silent as to the governing law, although the testator's will directed
Mississippi law to apply when determining the identity of "heirs." The Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals applied Mississippi law to construe the trust, citing
treatises by Leflar and Scott as authority.63 In Hartsfield v. Lescher,64 the
land was located in Arkansas, and so the court, also citing Scott, applied
Arkansas law, even though the will creating the trust was probated in Ten-
nessee.
The third case involved a married couple who had created several
trusts while residing in Florida.65 The trust of the now-deceased wife was at
issue. The couple had relocated to Arkansas and the surviving husband, trust
res (mostly personal property), and trustee were all located in Arkansas,
until the husband convinced the trustee to distribute the trust assets to him,
whereupon he moved to Wisconsin. The trust, however, stated that the gov-
erning law of the trust was to be that of Florida. The court, also citing Scott
as authority, applied Florida law to determine that the trustee had committed
breach of trust.
6 6
On the other hand, the law with respect to wills is clear.
In sum, Arkansas law has consistently followed the rule that the law of
the situs of real property governs the effect and interpretation of wills
purporting to devise such land. Thus, any will, regardless of where it
was executed or where the testator resided at the time of his or her death,
that purports to devise real property located in this state will be inter-
preted and construed under the laws of this state.
6 7
62. "We recognize that there is ample authority for the proposition that, in the case of a
testamentary trust involving land, the law of the situs of the land applies." Rainey v. Holland,
No. CA98-1112, 1999 WL 318060, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. May 12, 1999).
63. Id.
64. Hartsfield v. Lescher, 721 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
65. Dunkley v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 728 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
66. Id. at 555-56.
67. Craig v. Carrigo, 353 Ark. 761, 770, 121 S.W.3d 154, 159 (2003).
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F. Principal Place of Administration-Section 10868
A trust's principal place of administration will ordinarily determine
which court has jurisdiction over the trust; in other words, where the trus-
tees and beneficiaries have consented to be sued.69 The principal place of
administration may also determine where state income taxes will be paid.7°
The principal place of administration will normally be where the trustee is
located, although this can be difficult to determine if a trustee has several
offices in different states, or if there are co-trustees located in different
states.71 Trustees who wish to transfer the principal place of administration
may have to give notice, and seek court approval if a beneficiary objects,
68. This section reads as follows:
(a) Without precluding other means for establishing a sufficient connection with
the designated jurisdiction, terms of a trust designating the principal place of
administration are valid and controlling if:
(1) a trustee's principal place of business is located in or a trustee is a resi-
dent of the designated jurisdiction; or
(2) all or part of the administration occurs in the designated jurisdiction.
(b) A trustee is under a continuing duty to administer the trust at a place appro-
priate to its purposes, its administration, and the interests of the beneficiaries.
(c) Without precluding the right of a court to order, approve, or disapprove a
transfer, the trustee, in furtherance of the duty prescribed by subsection (b) of
this section, may transfer the trust's principal place of administration to another
state or to a jurisdiction outside of the United States.
(d) The trustee shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of a proposed transfer of a
trust's principal place of administration not less than sixty (60) days before initi-
ating the transfer. The notice of proposed transfer must include:
(1) the name of the jurisdiction to which the principal place of administra-
tion is to be transferred;
(2) the address and telephone number at the new location at which the trus-
tee can be contacted;
(3) an explanation of the reasons for the proposed transfer;
(4) the date on which the proposed transfer is anticipated to occur; and
(5) the date, not less than sixty (60) days after the giving of the notice, by
which the qualified beneficiary must notify the trustee of an objection to
the proposed transfer.
(e) The authority of a trustee under this section to transfer a trust's principal
place of administration terminates if a qualified beneficiary notifies the trustee of
an objection to the proposed transfer on or before the date specified in the notice.
(f) In connection with a transfer of the trust's principal place of administration,
the trustee may transfer some or all of the trust property to a successor trustee
designated in the terms of the trust or appointed pursuant to § 28-73-704.
(g) Subsections (d) and (e) of this section apply only to irrevocable trusts created
on or after September 1, 2005 and to revocable trusts which become irrevocable
on or after September 1, 2005.
ATC § 28-73-108.
69. UTC § 108 cmt.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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unless the trust was irrevocable before September 1, 2005. Arkansas law on
this question is nonexistent, and thus enactment of the ATC will provide
clarity. The law of the principal place of administration is not necessarily
the same as the law governing the interpretation of the trust. A settlor is free
to designate one jurisdiction as the principal place of administration and
another to govern the interpretation of the trust.
72
EXAMPLE: Settlor and qualified beneficiary S, a resident of Arizona,
establishes a revocable trust whose res is 6,000 acres in Chicot County,
Arkansas. Trustee T is an Arizona licensed trust company. Qualified
beneficiaries A and B live in Arkansas. Can the trust's principal place of
administration be Arizona and can the law governing the trust be that of
Arkansas? ANSWER: Yes. A suit over the trust would probably have to
be brought in Arizona, but if the dispute was over the interpretation of
the trust, the Arizona court would apply Arkansas law.
G. Nonjudicial Settlements-Section 11 13
In the laudable furtherance of out-of-court settlements, another impor-
tant section of the ATC sets out rules for these types of agreements. The
same persons who would have to consent to a binding judicial settlement
may enter into a nonjudicial settlement. There are limits: the settlement may
72. Id.
73. This section reads as follows:
(a) For purposes of this section, "interested persons" means persons whose con-
sent would be required in order to achieve a binding settlement were the settle-
ment to be approved by the court.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, interested per-
sons may enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement with respect to
any matter involving a trust.
(c) A nonjudicial settlement agreement is valid only to the extent it does not vio-
late a material purpose of the trust and includes terms and conditions that could
be properly approved by the court under this chapter or other applicable law.
(d) Matters that may be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement agreement include:
(1) the interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
(2) the approval of a trustee's report or accounting;
(3) direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or the
grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
(4) the resignation or appointment of a trustee and the determination of a
trustee's compensation;
(5) transfer of a trust's principal place of administration; and
(6) liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust.
(e) Any interested person may request a court to approve a nonjudicial settle-
ment agreement, to determine whether the representation as provided in sub-
chapter 3 of this chapter was adequate, and to determine whether the agreement
contains terms and conditions a court could have properly approved.
ATC § 28-73-111.
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not violate a material purpose of the trust (in Arkansas this would include a
spendthrift provision),74 and it must include terms that could be approved by
the court, that is, terms that are valid under the ATC. Indeed, any interested
person may petition the court to approve such a settlement. The statutory list
of matters that can be resolved by such a settlement is nonexclusive.75 This
section codifies and clarifies this area of the law and should facilitate more
trust settlements.
H. Rules of Construction-Same for Wills and Trusts-Section 112
The ATC extends rules of construction for wills to trusts. This does not
change already-existing Arkansas law, as the Supreme Court has stated that
when construing a trust, it applies the same rules applicable to the construc-
tion of wills. 76 Construction of wills and trusts hinges on the intent of the
testator or settlor and the wording of the instrument. The most important
principle is that the intent of the testator governs. 77 Intent "is to be deter-
mined from viewing the four comers of the instrument, considering the lan-
guage used, and giving meaning to all of its provisions. 78 The court may
interpret the trust language in light of the settlor's knowledge at the time the
trust was executed. 79 The court should give effect to each clause; only when
two clauses irreconcilably conflict must one give way to the other.80 In both
wills and trusts, directions are mandatory when words direct or require
something to be done; but directions are held to be precatory when the
words merely express a hope or wish, and leave it uncertain as to whether
the desires will be accomplished.8'
IV. ARTICLE 2-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Article 2 of the ATC covers selected issues involving judicial proceed-
ings, especially those where the trust has contacts in more than one state or
country. It may apply in conjunction with other statutes, for example, the
74. ATC § 2 8- 73 -411(c).
75. UTC § lll crnt.
76. Aycock Pontiac, Inc. v. Aycock, 335 Ark. 456, 463, 983 S.W.2d 915, 919 (1998). In
fact, the court has stated that the same rules of construction apply to deeds as well. Murphy
v. Morris, 200 Ark. 932, 937, 141 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1940).
77. Aycock, 335 Ark. at 463, 983 S.W.2d at 919 (citing In re Estate of Lindsey, 309 Ark.
596, 832 S.W.2d 808 (1992) and In re Estate of Conover, 304 Ark. 268; 801 S.W.2d 299
(1990)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 463, 983 S.W.2d at 919-20.
81. Patterson v. Polk, 229 Ark. 272, 282, 317 S.W.2d 286, 292 (1958),
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Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 20182 allows courts to intervene
in the administration of trusts, but does not require routine or mandatory
court supervision of all trusts. The ATC does not require trusts to be regis-
tered, that is, recorded.83 This section does not preclude a judicial proceed-
ing to receive instructions from the court or to declare the rights of the par-
ties.
Section 20284 clarifies that if the trust's principal place of administra-
tion is, for example, Arkansas, the trustee and beneficiary have submitted
personally to the Arkansas courts' jurisdiction over trust matters. However,
this section does not preclude jurisdiction by courts elsewhere on some
other basis. Section 20385 confers jurisdiction over trusts to Arkansas circuit
courts. Section 204 contained the rules for setting the venue for a trust case,
but it was removed by House amendment, thus leaving the current rules for
venue in place.
82. This section reads as follows:
(a) A court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent its juris-
diction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law.
(b) A trust is not subject to continuing judicial supervision unless ordered by the
court.
(c) A judicial proceeding involving a trust may relate to any matter involving the
trust's administration, including a request for instructions and an action to de-
clare rights.
ATC § 28-73-201.
83. Article VII of the Uniform Probate Code provides for the registration of trusts. This
article, except for the registration provisions, has been superseded by the UTC. UTC prefa-
tory note. A number of states, not including Arkansas, allow or require the registration of
trusts. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3816 (Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-16-101
to-105 (2003).
84. This section reads as follows:
(a) By accepting the trusteeship of a trust having its principal place of admini-
stration in this state or by moving the principal place of administration to this
state, the trustee submits personally to the jurisdiction of a court of this state re-
garding any matter involving the trust.
(b) With respect to their interests in the trust, the beneficiaries of a trust having
its principal place of administration in this state are subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state regarding any matter involving the trust. By accepting a
distribution from such a trust, the recipient submits personally to the jurisdiction
of a court of this state regarding any matter involving the trust.
(c) This section does not pretXlude o'her me'thods of obtaining jurisdiction ovvr a
trustee, beneficiary, or other person receiving property from the trust.
ATC § 28-73-202.
85. This section reads as follows: "The circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction of pro-
ceedings in this state brought by a trustee or beneficiary concerning the administration of a
trust or of other proceedings involving a trust." ATC § 28-73-203.
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V. ARTICLE 3-REPRESENTATION
Article 3 concerns representation of settlors and beneficiaries. Repre-
sentation is the power of a representative to receive notice or to consent and
so bind the settlor or beneficiary represented. As the modem trend to
-weaken oT abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities and to allow dynasti trusts
continues,86 -albeit not in Arkansas87 -representation becomes more im-
portant with respect to the unborn, because trust law requires notice to, or
consent by, beneficiaries, for certain actions to occur.88 Representation is
also an issue with respect to incompetent settlors and beneficiaries.
86. As of 2001, only Alabama, Arkansas, the District of Columbia and Wyoming pre-
served the "pure," unreformed common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Twenty-four states
had enacted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, which extends "the common
law "21 years beyond a life in being" period to ninety years after the creation of the interest.
Alaska, Idaho, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin had abolished any
type of Rule Against Perpetuities. The remaining states had enacted some type of reform of
the Rule, usually a "wait-and-see" approach. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 334 (5th ed. 2002); see also Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588, 2590-95 (2003) (stating the trend in state law, summarizing
arguments for and against the Rule Against Perpetuities, and exploring how estate planning
attorneys use dynasty trusts).
87. "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not
be allowed .... " ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 19. This provision makes the abolition of the Rule
Against Perpetuities impossible without a constitutional amendment, but would allow the
passage of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP). USRAP allows for a
"wait-and-see" period of ninety years after the creation of an interest. At that point, if an
interest is still contingent, it is invalid.
88. Under the ATC, these actions include, for example: transfer of a trust's principal
place of administration to another state, § 28-73-108; modification or termination of a trust, §
28-73-411; combination of trusts into one, or division of one trust into two or more, § 28-73-
417; resignation of a trustee, § 28-73-705; and release of a trustee from potential liability, §
28-73-1009.
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A. The Basic Effect of Representation-Section 30189
Notice to or consent by the representative binds the person represented,
unless the person represented objects before the consent would have be-
come effective. A person such as a conservator or agent representing a
settlor who lacks capacity may receive notice and give consent on the
settlor's behalf, unless the action to be taken is the termination or revocation
of a revocable trust, in which case express authority is needed. Due to some
concerns regarding possible negative tax implications, section 301 was
amended by the NCCUSL in July 2004. Subsection (d) was added, which
prevents a settlor from representing a beneficiary with respect to the termi-
nation or modification of a trust under section 411 (a). 90
B. Different Types of Representation-Sections 302 through 305
Section 30291 allows the holder of a general testamentary power of ap-
pointment to represent and bind persons whose interests are subject to the
power if there is no conflict of interest. The conflict of interest exception
will preclude from this section the numerous trusts where the holder of the
power is also a life income beneficiary, and thus would be in conflict with
the appointees or takers in default.92 Section 30393 applies to both benefici-
89. This section reads as follows:
(a) Notice to a person who may represent and bind another person under this
subchapter has the same effect as if notice were given directly to the other per-
son.
(b) The consent of a person who may represent and bind another person under
this subchapter is binding on the person represented unless the person repre-
sented objects to the representation before the consent would otherwise have be-
come effective.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in §§ 28-73-411 and 28-73-602, a person who
under this subchapter may represent a settlor who lacks capacity may receive no-
tice and give a binding consent on the settlor's behalf.
(d) A settlor may not represent and bind a beneficiary under this subchapter with
respect to the termination or modification of a trust under § 28-73-411 (a).
ATC § 28-73-301.
90. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed discus-
sion).
91. This section reads as follows:
To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the holder of a general tes-
tamentary power of appointment and the persons represented with respect to the
particular question or dispute, the holder may represent and bind persons whose
interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or otherwise, are subject to
the power.
ATC § 28-73-302.
92. UTC § 302 cmt.
93. This section reads as follows:
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aries and settlors. It mostly codifies the common law 94 in stating that, absent
any conflicts of interest, conservators95 and guardians may represent and
bind their wards; 96 agents with authority may represent and bind their prin-
cipals; trustees may represent and bind the trust beneficiaries; and personal
representatives may represent and bind persons with interests in the estate.
New to Arkansas law, howeveT, is section 3%03(6), -which empowers a
parent to represent and bind her own minor and unborn children without the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. However, this section does not prevent
a court from appointing a guardian ad litem if it decides that one is neces-
sary. This section is broader than current Arkansas law in one respect: The
existing Arkansas statutes on trust revocation, modification and termination
require the court to first appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn beneficiar-
ies, if any, before the court can consent to any type of change in the trust.97
So in this circumstance, if the section 28-69-401 procedure is being fol-
lowed, arguably a parent could not represent unborn or minor children.
To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the representative and the
person represented or among those being represented with respect to a particular
question or dispute:
(1) a conservator may represent and bind the estate that the conservator controls;
(2) a guardian may represent and bind the ward if a conservator of the ward's es-
tate has not been appointed;
(3) an agent having authority to act with respect to the particular question or dis-
pute may represent and bind the principal;
(4) a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust;
(5) a personal representative of a decedent's estate may represent and bind per-
sons interested in the estate; and
6) a parent may represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a guard-
ian for the child has not been appointed.
ATC § 28-73-303.
94. See, e.g., Drayer v. Wright, 301 Ark. 144, 782 S.W.2d 582 (1990) (holding that a
trust beneficiary was bound by a judgment where she was represented in court by a guardian
ad litem); Selig v. Barnett, 233 Ark. 900, 350 S.W.2d 176 (1961) (holding that a ward was
bound by a judgment where he was legally represented by a guardian in court).
95. A conservator is the more recent term for a "guardian of the estate." Under Arkansas
statutory law, "conservators" may be appointed for persons of advanced age or with physical
disabilities who cannot manage their property. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-67-103 (LEXIS 2004).
All other wards, such as minors or mentally ill persons, have guardians of the estate. Id.
§§ 28-65-101, -104.
96. Under the ATC, a guardian, or "guardian of the person" may only bind a ward in
trust matters if no conservator has been appointed. ATC § 28-78-303 (2).
97. "For purposes of this section, consent to the revocation, modification, or termination
may be given by the court on behalf of unnamed, legally incapacitated, unascertained, or
inborn beneficiaries after a hearing in which the interests of such beneficiaries are repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem." ARfK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-401(b)(1) (LEXIS 2004). The
power to appoint a guardian ad litem is not discretionary.
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Section 30498 concerns the doctrine of "virtual representation." It al-
lows for minors, incapacitated persons, unborn individuals, or persons
whose identity or location is unknown to be represented by another person
with a substantially identical interest as long as there is no conflict of inter-
est. This representative is not a guardian ad litem, but is instead another
beneficiary or contingent beneficiary. In other words, a virtual representa-
tive is an alternative to a guardian ad litem. Some states have virtual repre-
sentation statutes9 9-Arkansas does not. Arkansas law is thin in this area-
only two cases discuss the doctrine with respect to probate law. In the most
recent case, a decedent devised his estate "absolutely" to his spouse but also
devised "whatever she may leave undisposed of' to his and her heirs. 100
During the probate of his estate, she listed herself as life beneficiary in the
accounting, and the probate court's decree split the remainder between the
two sets of heirs.10 ' The Arkansas Supreme Court construed the will as de-
vising a fee simple in all property to the wife. 10 2 The husband's heirs argued
that the wife's heirs were bound by the wife's statement and the probate
court's decree under the doctrine of virtual representation, but the Supreme
Court disagreed, because the wife did not represent the same interest as
theirs.'O3
In a second case, a decedent executed a will and a testamentary trust,
providing income to some (but not all) of his siblings and at their death, the
remainder to go to the siblings' children and other nieces and nephews. 104
At his death the siblings and the other nieces and nephews sued to construe
the trust. 0 5 The probate court held that the trust failed and that the will was
void. 0 6 It ruled that the petitioners were the decedent's heirs and ordered
the property (land) to be distributed among them.'0 7 These heirs attempted to
98. This section reads as follows:
Unless otherwise represented, a minor, incapacitated, or unborn individual, or a
person whose identity or location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable,
may be represented by and bound by another having a substantially identical in-
terest with respect to the particular question or dispute, but only to the extent
there is no conflict of interest between the representative and the person repre-
sented.
ATC § 28-73-304.
99. See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.1 (West Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 55-3-31-55-3-38 (LEXIS 2001 & Supp. 2003). The Uniform Probate Code also
allows representation. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403, 8 U.L.A. 69 (1998).
100. Collie v. Tucker, 229 Ark. 606, 607-08, 317 S.W.2d 137, 139 (1958).
101. Id. at 609, 317 S.W.2d at 140.
102. Id. at 610, 317 S.W.2d at 140.
103. Id., 317 S.W.2d at 140.
104. Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009, 33 S.W.2d 369 (1930).
105. Id. at 1011, 33 S.W.2d at 369.
106. Id., 33 S.W.2d at 369.
107. Id., 33 S.W.2d at 369-70.
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sell the land to a purchaser who refused to go through with the deal, assert-
ing that title was not merchantable because the decree of the probate court
could be attacked by the children of the siblings, who were trust remainder
beneficiaries but were not parties in the suit. 0 8 The sellers, the heirs, argued
that the children were bound by the decree under the doctrine of virtual rep-
resentation. 109 The court disagreed. 1 Since the children were named in the
trust and will, they did not stand in privity to their parents, and should have
been included as necessary parties."' The doctrine of virtual representation
did not apply. 1
2
Under common law, virtual representation in the probate and trust
sphere has been allowed with respect to the unborn, although there are no
Arkansas cases on this point. The ATC extends it to minors and incapaci-
tated individuals." 13
Section 305114 allows the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for any-
one if the other alternatives under this article are nonexistent or inadequate.
The UTC calls the appointee a "representative." The ATC has changed this
label to "guardian ad litem." The Comment to UTIC Section 3q5 explained
how a representative is different from a guardian ad litem: A representative
can serve in a nonjudicial settlement, or can receive notice on behalf of a
beneficiary. This section, like Section 303, will thus expand somewhat the
role of the guardian ad litem in Arkansas.
108. Id., 33 S.W.2d at 370.
109. Crow Creek, 182 Ark. at 1012, 33 S.W.2d at 370.
110. Id. at 1009, 1014, 33 S.W.2d at 370.
111. Id. at 1013-14, 33 S.W.2d at 370.
112. The court also noted that even if it had agreed with the virtual representation argu-
ment, the sibling omitted from the will would be an heir at law and thus was also entitled to
attack the judgment, rendering title unmarketable. Id., 33 S.W.2d 370.
113. UTC § 304 cmt. For more on virtual representation, see RESTATF-MENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 65 cmts. b-c (2001); Martin D. Begleiter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Pro-
ceedings, 20 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 643, 721-39 (1984).
114. This section reads as follows:
(a) If a court determines that ali interest is not represented under this subchapter,
or that the otherwise available representation might be inadequate, the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem to receive notice, give consent, and otherwise repre-
sent, bind, and act on behalf of a minor, incapacitated, or unborn individual, or a
person whose identity or location is unknown. A guardian ad litem may be ap-
pointed to represent several persons or interests.
(b) A guardian ad litem may act on behalf of the individual represented with re-
spect to any matter arising under this chapter, whether or not a judicial proceed-
ing concerning the trust is pending.
(c) In making decisions, a guardian ad litem may consider general benefit accru-
ing to the living members of the individual's family.
ATC § 28-73-305.
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VI. ARTICLE 4-CREATION, VALIDITY, MODIFICATION, AND
TERMINATION OF TRUSTS
Article 4 concerns the creation, validity, modification and termination
of trusts. Sections 401 through 409 cover the requirements for the creation
of a trust, and "largely codify traditional doctrine." '1 15 Arkansas statutes cur-
rently allow for the modification, revocation, or termination of trusts if the
settlor's purpose has become impossible to carry out,'16 and their interaction
with the ATC are discussed below.
A. Methods of Creating a Trust-Section 401117
This section codifies the common law. It specifies the methods for cre-
ating inter vivos, testamentary, and self-settled trusts (trusts where the
settlor is also beneficiary, and, often, a trustee). Property may be transferred
inter vivos, either to a trustee or to oneself as a trustee. It may be devised to
a trust, either one already existing or one to come into being at death. Fi-
nally, a power of appointment may be exercised in favor of a trustee, in
either an inter vivos or testamentary manner. The methods in this section are
not exclusive-a trust can also be created by special statute, court order, or
by a promise that creates enforceable rights in a person who then holds the
rights as a trustee." 
8
Under the ATC, a trust does not come into existence until it receives
property. The drafters note that the property interest necessary to fund and
create a trust need not be substantial. For instance, both the ATC and cur-
rent Arkansas law recognize the life insurance trust-a trust created by
revocably designating a trustee as the beneficiary of a life insurance pol-
icy-as valid." 9 Also, a pourover devise taking place at death to a previ-
115. UTC art. 4 general cmt.
116. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-69-401-28-69-403 (LEXIS 2004).
117. This section reads as follows:
A trust may be created by:
(1) Transfer of property to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime
or by will or other disposition taking effect upon the settlor's death;
(2) Declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable prop-
erty as trustee; or
(3) Exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a trustee.
ATC § 28-73-401.
118. UTC § 401 cmt.
119. Life insurance trusts are not uncommon in divorce settlements in Arkansas, where
they are established for the benefit of minor children. They are specifically validated by the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-27-101-28-27-106
(LEXIS 2004).
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ously executed but unfunded trust is valid under Arkansas law, 12 as it is in
virtually all states.
With the number of self-settled, revocable inter vivos trusts increasing,
litigation over their creation is likely to grow. The Comment makes clear
that if such property is merely listed with the declaration of trust, the actual
transfer need not be made, 121 a1thQoUgh ack of the transfer is an invitation to
litigation after the settlor's death. The ATC thus liberalizes Arkansas law
somewhat. The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed this issue recently in an
opinion concerning a settlor who had executed a declaration of trust to es-
122tablish an inter vivos trust, naming himself as the beneficiary. He owned
nine tracts of real estate and deeded the tracts to himself, attaching the quit-
claim deeds to the declaration of trusts. 23 A disinherited grandchild sued,
attacking the validity of the deeds to transfer the land into the trust, since the
deeds did not convey the property either to a trust or to the grantee as trus-
tee. 124 The court held that a valid inter vivos trust had been established and
that considered altogether, the declaration, attached schedule of trust assets,
and quitclaim deeds were sufficient to prove the existence of the trust and
the transfer of the property into the trust.
25
Nonetheless, a prudent settlor of a self-settled trust should execute a
declaration of trust and transfer all of the desired property to herself as trus-
tee for the trust, attaching a list of the property to the trust instrument.
126
120. Id. § 28-27-101.
121. "A declaration of trust can be funded merely by attaching a schedule listing the
assets that are to be subject to the trust without executing separate instruments of transfer."
UTC § 401 cmt.
122. Sutter v. Sutter, 345 Ark. 12, 43 S.W.3d 736 (2001).
123. Id. at 15, 43 S.W.3d at 738.
124. d. at 17, 43 S.W.3d at 739.
125. Id.; see also Trott v. Jones, _ Ark. App. _ (CA 03-584, Apr. 7, 2004, 2004 WL
739964), for a slightly different fact situation. In this case, the settlor executed an instrument
titled "General Testamentary Trust" declaring herself a life beneficiary of the trust and a
husband and wife (not her heirs) to be trustees during her life, and remainder beneficiaries at
her death. Id. The settlor owned a house and bank account at her death, but had not trans-
ferred them to the trust or the trustees during her life. Id. Citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS §16(1) (2003), the court held that no trust existed in either the house or bank ac-
count. In dictum, the court, citing the RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 10(c) (2003) com-
ment, stated that a simple declaration would suffice where a settlor was creating a self-settled
trust-no transfer of property is necessary. Id.
126. The procedure for deeding real property to a trust differs from state to state. In Ar-
kansas, a deed to a trustee must also state the name of the trust to be effective. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 18-12-604 (LEXIS 2003).
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B. The Basic Requirements for Creation of a Trust-Section 402127
The first requirements for the creation of a trust are that the settlor
must have the capacity and intent to create a trust. What capacity is neces-
sary to create a trust? The Comment to this section states that the capacity to
create a will is necessary to create either a revocable or a testamentary trust.
To create an irrevocable trust, the settlor must have the capacity to execute a
deed. The elements that make up the capacity necessary to deed or will
property are found in numerous Arkansas cases, although they do not al-
ways say the same thing. Only one case has stated that the capacity test for
wills, deeds and testamentary trusts are identical. "The law regarding mental
capacity in the execution of a will is also applicable to the execution of a
deed and the creation of a trust."'' 28 A maker of deeds, wills and "other in-
struments" must have the knowledge, without prompting, of the extent and
condition of her property and the understanding how she is disposing of it,
to whom, and upon what consideration. 129 Another line of cases, concerning
wills only, has phrased the requirements of capacity slightly differently and
adds the requirement that the testator must know whom she is excluding
from the will.' 30
Beyond these requirements, to be valid under common law a trust had
to have either an ascertainable beneficiary or be a charitable trust. Section
127. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trust is created only if:
(1) the settlor has capacity to create a trust;
(2) the settlor indicates an intention to create the trust;
(3) the trust has a definite beneficiary or is:
(A) a charitable trust;
(B) a trust for the care of an animal, as provided in § 28-73-408; or
(C) a trust for a noncharitable purpose, as provided in
§ 28-73-409;
(4) the trustee has duties to perform; and
(5) the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.
(b) A beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the
future, subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities.
(c) A power in a trustee to select a beneficiary from an indefinite class is valid. If
the power is not exercised within a reasonable time, the power fails and the
property subject to the power passes to the persons who would have taken the
property had the power not been conferred.
ATC § 28-73-402.
128. Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 46, 679 S.W.2d 180, 182 (1984).
129. Garis v. Massey, 270 Ark. 646, 648, 606 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980);
Pledger v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 455, 246 S.W. 510, 515 (1923).
130. "Our generally expressed rule for testamentary capacity is that the testatrix must be
able to know the natural objects of her bounty and the extent of her property; to understand
to whom the property is being given; and to realize those who are being excluded from the
will." In re Estate of Davidson, 310 Ark. 639, 643, 839 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1992).
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402 repeats these requirements and, in addition, validates two new types of
"honorary" trusts unknown at common law: the trust for the care of an ani-
mal and the noncharitable trust without an ascertainable beneficiary.13'
Further, for a trust to be valid, this section requires the trustee to have
duties, codifying the common law that a trust must be active as opposed to
passive. The ATC also codifies the common law prohibition against merger:
The same person cannot be the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary of a
trust. 
1 32
C. Validity of Trusts Created in Other Jurisdictions-Section 403133
At common law, a trust was valid if its creation complied with the law
of the state having the most significant contacts with the trust. 134 The ATC
expands the common law rule to include the possibility of other jurisdic-
tions. Trusts created by will are not included in this section because the
common law rule with respect to testamentary trusts is that the validity of
their creation is determined by the law of the decedent's domicile. 135 Ar-
kansas has a wills statute that is the equivalent of this section 36 but has no
trust law directly on point.
131. One commentator labels these "noncharitable purpose trusts." Alexander A. Bove,
Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, PROB. & PROP. 34 (May/June 2004) (discussing the
origin and treatment by the UTC of purpose trusts).
132. See McCollum v. McColluni 328 Ark. 607, 612 n.3, 946 S.W,2d 181, 183 n.3
(1997) (recognizing the doctrine of merger but not applying it in the instant case).
133. This section reads as follows:
A trust not created by will is validly created if its creation complies with the law
of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was executed, or the law of the
jurisdiction in which, at the time of creation:
(1) the settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national;
(2) a trustee was domiciled or had a place of business; or
(3) any trust property was located.
ATC § 28-73-403.
134. UTC § 403 cmt.
135. Id.
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-105 (LEXIS 2004).
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D. Trust Purposes-Sections 404137 and 405138
Section 404 simply codifies the common law rules that to be valid,
trust purposes must be lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to
achieve; and that trusts must benefit their beneficiaries. These rules are also
found in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 139 and have been cited with
approval by one Arkansas case.
140
Section 405 codifies the "well-established categories of charitable pur-
poses... that ultimately derive from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz.
I, c. 4 (1601).'' 141 These are already a part of Arkansas common law by vir-
tue of our reception statute. 142 In addition, this section allows a court to
choose a charitable purpose or beneficiary if the terms of the trust state a
general charitable purpose without any specificity. Subsection (c) is an in-
novation, allowing a settlor of a charitable trust to maintain a proceeding to
enforce the trust. Traditionally, only the beneficiaries of a trust have had
standing to enforce the trust; the settlor has not. This subsection contravenes
the Restatement (Second), but Arkansas has no case law on this point. The
argument for the new rule is that in cases where the trustees are breaching
their fiduciary duty and the attorney general does not act, the settlor may
137. This section reads as follows: "A trust may be created only to the extent its purposes
are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust and its terms must
be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." ATC § 28-73-404.
138. This section reads as follows:
(a) A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of
education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal pur-
poses, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the commu-
nity.
(b) If the terms of a charitable trust do not indicate a particular charitable pur-
pose or beneficiary, the court may select one or more charitable purposes or
beneficiaries. The selection must be consistent with the settlor's intention to the
extent it can be ascertained.
(c) The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to
enforce the trust.
ATC § 28-73-405.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 59-65 (1959).
140. Lytle v. Zebold, 227 Ark. 431, 434, 299 S.W.2d 74, 76 (1957) (stating that a trust
can be valid even if some of its material purposes are impossible to achieve).
141. UTC § 405 cmt. The Statute is a part of Arkansas's common law by means of our
reception statute.
142. The common law of England, so far as it is applicable and of a general nature, and
all statutes of the British Parliament in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law
made prior to March 24, 1606, which are applicable to our own form of government, of a
general nature and not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States or the Constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of deci-
sion in this state unless altered or repealed by the General Assembly of this state.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (Michie 1996); see also Biscoe v. Thweatt, 74 Ark. 545, 549, 86
S.W. 432, 433 (1905) (affirming the reception of the statute and adoption of the doctrine).
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bring a suit. This right of the settlor does not diminish the rights of the at-
torney general, or other parties with interests, to sue.
143
E. Fraud and Oral Trusts-Sections 40644 and 407145
Section 406 codifies Arkansas common law and voids trusts to the ex-
tent that their creation was induced by fraud, duress or undue influence.
146
Section 407 validates oral trusts if their terms can be established by clear
and convincing evidence, unless another statute is in conflict. The most ob-
vious example of this would be the Statute of Frauds, if the trust concerns
real property. This section is in accord with current Arkansas law, which
recognizes the creation of an oral trust in personal property if the proof is
clear and convincing, 147 but will not recognize an oral express trust in real
property because of the Statute of Frauds. 1
48
143. Apparently the standing given the settlor of a charitable trust does not extend to the
settlor's successors in interest, arguably rendering it of little value. See Ronald Chester,
Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers under 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code
and Related Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be? 37 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 611 (2003) (arguing that the settlor's standing to enforce charitable trusts
should extend to the settlor's successors in interest). For information about the Arkansas
Attorney General's role in enforcing charitable trusts, see supra note 48.
144. This section reads as follows: "A trust is void to the extent its creation was induced
by fraud, duress, or undue influence." ATC § 28-73-406.
145. This section reads as follows: "Except as required by a statute other than this chap-
ter, a trust need not be evidenced by a trust instrument, but the creation of an oral trust and its
terms may be established only by clear and convincing evidence." ATC § 28-73-407.
146. See Hughes v. Coffey, 222 Ark. 945, 946, 263 S.W.2d 689, 690 (1954) (holding that
a trust cannot be invalidated where there was no evidence of fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence).
147. Moore v. Lawrence, 252 Ark. 759, 766, 480 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1972).
148. Bottenfield v. Wood, 264 Ark. 505, 509, 573 S.W.2d 307, 309 (1978).
20051
UALR LAW REVIEW
F. Honorary Trusts-New to Arkansas-Sections 408149 and 40950
Section 408 introduces the first type of honorary trust-a trust for care
of an animal. Impossible under common law because an animal was a le-
gally insufficient beneficiary, the trust rendered valid under the ATC by
appointing a person to enforce it. Such a trust terminates on the death of the
animal. Section 409 likewise expands the common law by allowing trusts
for general but noncharitable purposes, such as care of a cemetery plot, or
for specific noncharitable purposes, such as money to be distributed to such
objects as the trustee desires. Note that the ATC caps the lifetime of section
409 trusts at twenty-one years.
149. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the
settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust
was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the
settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed in
the terms of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by a
court. A person having an interest in the welfare of the animal may request the
court to appoint a person to enforce the trust or to remove a person appointed.
(c) Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its in-
tended use, except to the extent a court determines that the value of the trust
property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except as otherwise
provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the intended use must
be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors in
interest.
ATC § 28-73-408.
150. This section reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in § 28-73-408 or by another statute, the following
rules apply:
(1) a trust may be created for a noncharitable purpose without a definite or defi-
nitely ascertainable beneficiary or for a noncharitable but otherwise valid pur-
pose to be selected by the trustee. The trust may not be enforced for more than
twenty-one (21) years;
(2) a trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed in
the terms of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by a
court; and
(3) property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its in-
tended use, except to the extent a court determines that the value of the trust
property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. Except as otherwise
provided in the terms of the trust, property not required for the intended use must
be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors in
interest.
ATC § 28-73-409.
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G. Modification, Revocation, and Termination of Trusts-Sections 410
through 417
Sections 410 through 417 deal with modification, revocation, and ter-
mination of trusts, including their combination and division. The ATC fa-
cilitates the modification, revocation and termination of trusts. This is al-
most the only area covered by the ATC in which Arkansas currently has
statutes.151 They have not been repealed; therefore, attorneys dealing with
these issues should take care to familiarize themselves with both sets of
statutes.
Section 410152 of the ATC codifies common law and for various rea-
sons terminates certain trusts by operation of law. The section sets out
which parties may commence proceedings to approve or disapprove modifi-
cations, terminations, combinations, or divisions. One change from common
law allows the settlor of a charitable trust to bring a proceeding to modify
the trust. Arkansas has no law on this latter point.
Section 411153 applies to the modification or termination of nonchari-
table irrevocable trusts at the request of the beneficiaries in three circum-
151. Modification, revocation and termination of trusts are covered at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 28-69-401-28-69-403. Division of trusts are addressed at id. §§ 28-69-701-28-69-706.
152. This section reads as follows:
(a) In addition to the methods of termination prescribed by §§ 28-73-411-28-73-
414, a trust terminates to the extent the trust is revoked or expires pursuant to its
terms, no purpose of the trust remains to be achieved, or the purposes of the trust
have become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve.
(b) A proceeding to approve or disapprove a proposed modification or termina-
tion under §§ 28-73-411-28-73-416, or trust combination or division under § 28-
73-417, may be commenced by a trustee or beneficiary, and a proceeding to ap-
prove or disapprove a proposed modification or termination under § 28-73-411
may be commenced by the settlor. The settlor of a charitable trust may maintain
a proceeding to modify the trust under § 28-73-413.
ATC § 28-73-410.
153. This section reads as follows:
(a) (1) A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified or terminated upon
consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries, even if the modification or termina-
tion is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
(2) A settlor's power to consent to a trust's modification or termination may
be exercised by:
(A) an agent under a power of attorney only to the extent expressly au-
thorized by the power of attorney or the terms of the trust;
(B) the settlor's conservator with the approval of the court supervising
the conservatorship if an agent is not so authorized; or
(C) the settlor's guardian with the approval of the court supervising the
guardianship if an agent is not so authorized and a conservator has not
been appointed.
(b) A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be:
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stances: if the settlor and beneficiaries agree to the change; if the beneficiar-
ies, but not the settlor, agree; and if only some of the beneficiaries agree.
Cases where the settlor and all of the beneficiaries wish to modify or
terminate a trust are rare.154 Usually the settlor is deceased by the time that
beneficiaries ask for modification or termination. Unanimous consent of all
beneficiaries, including contingent beneficiaries, may be impossible to ob-
tain. 155 Section 411(a) is notable because, unlike the requirements of our
current statute,156 no showing need be made that the trust is not carrying out
the settlor's purposes. All that is required is unanimous consent. Court ap-
proval is not required. If the settlor is represented by another, such as a con-
servator, note that additional conditions must be met.
57
(1) terminated upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if a court concludes
that continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any material pur-
pose of the trust; or
(2) modified upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if a court concludes
that modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
(c) A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is presumed to constitute a
material purpose of the trust.
(d) Upon termination of a trust under subsections (a) or (b) of this section, the
trustee shall distribute the trust property as agreed by the beneficiaries.
(e) If not all of the beneficiaries consent to a proposed modification or termina-
tion of the trust under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the modification or
termination may be approved by a court if the court is satisfied that:
(1) If all of the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modi-
fied or terminated under this section; and
(2) The interests of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately
protected.
ATC § 28-73-411.
154. But see Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Smith, 240 Ark. 354, 400 S.W.2d 652
(1966). Here a settlor established an irrevocable inter vivos trust for the benefit of himself,
his spouse, and his children with a church the ultimate remainder beneficiary. Id. at 355, 400,
S.W.2d at 652-53. The settlor later sued the trustee and the beneficiaries to set aside the
trust. Id., 400 S.W.2d at 653. The court held that, failing proof of incompetency (the evi-
dence was held to be insufficient), the settlor could not set aside the trust. Id. at 369, 400
S.W.2d at 660. The only authority cited was several cases involving the irrevocability of
deeds. The opinion did not make clear whether the beneficiaries were opposed to the revoca-
tion. Only the trustee appealed from the unfavorable trial court ruling that was overturned on
appeal. The ATC would allow revocation of the trust if all beneficiaries agreed.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 65(1) cmt. b (2001) for a discussion of this
issue.
156. By written consent of the settlor and all named beneficiaries of a trust or any part
thereof, regardless of any spendthrift or similar protective provisions, the trust or part thereof
may be revoked, modified, or terminated upon a finding by the court having jurisdiction over
tthe trust, o5rotherise being a vaopetext ,ristikiz, that Ahe tmsv's Prpses, as expessad
in or implied by the circumstances surrounding the trust, as a result of circumstances not
foreseen to the settlor are not effectively being fulfilled or are frustrated.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-401(a) (LEXIS 2004).
157. If the settlor is represenited by an attorney in fact, the power of attorney or terms of
the trust must authorize the power to consent to modification or termination. If the represen-
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Unlike section 402, which requires the settlor herself to have the ca-
pacity to create a trust, under Section 411 the settlor may be incapacitated
and her representative can still consent to the modification or termination of
a trust.
Nationally, section 411 (a) of the UTC has been the subject of some
debate. There was some concern that the ability of a settlor to modify or
terminate an irrevocable trust would cause the Internal Revenue Service to
view the trust as essentially revocable and thus taxable as a revocable trust
for estate tax purposes. 158 However, the NCCUSL is of the opinion that
"[m]any, if not most, practitioners do not believe that there is likely to be a
problem with Section 411, since the provision is basically acknowledged
common law already."' 5 9 In 2004 the NCCUSL modified section 411 to
apply only to new irrevocable trusts. At the same time section 301 was
modified to prevent a settlor from representing a beneficiary with respect to
411(a) terminations and modifications. The NCCUSL believes these
changes have solved whatever possible tax problems might have existed.
160
The Arkansas legislature adopted the latter modification, but not the former.
Even without the consent of the settlor, section 411(b) 161 of the ATC
allows a court to modify or terminate a trust if all beneficiaries consent and
if termination will not frustrate any material purpose of the trust. This provi-
sion codifies the "Claflin rule," which denies the termination of a trust
ahead of time, even when beneficiaries unanimously consent, if termination
would contravene a material purpose of the settlor. 162 Subsection (b) covers
the same issue as a current Arkansas statute. 163 Arkansas prevents modifica-
tative is a conservator, the supervising court must approve; and if the representative is a
guardian, the supervising court must approve and no conservator must have been appointed.
ATC § 28-73-411(a).
158. Legislative Update 2004, UTC NOTES, Summer 2004, at 1, 2,
http://www.utcproject.org/utc/uploads/UTCnotesJul04_print.pdf.
159. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1962), which states that
"[i]If the decedent's power could be exercised only with the consent of all parties having an
interest (vested or contingent) in the transferred property, and if the power adds nothing to
the rights of the parties under local law" then the trust property will not be considered part of
the decedent's taxable estate.
160. E-mail from David English, W.F. Fratcher Professor of Law, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia and Reporter for the Uniform Trust Code, to Lynn Foster, (Nov. 30, 2004)
(on file with author).
161. See supra note 153 for the text of the section.
162. Clatlin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1999); see Ronald Chester, Modification and
Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 716-17 (2001) (tracing the history of the rules for modifica-
tion and termination of charitable and non-charitable trusts and exploring the effect of the
UTC).
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-401 (LEXIS 2004).
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tion or termination if the settlor is alive and does not consent. 64 If the
settlor is deceased, the court may consent on behalf of the settlor's estate if
modification or termination will benefit the living.165 The ATC, allowing
modification or termination without the consent of a living settlor, is
broader.
At section 411(c), the UTC and the ATC diverge. With a goal of in-
creasing flexibility, the original UTC stated that "a spendthrift provision is
not presumed to constitute a material purpose,"1 66 obviously reflecting a
policy decision on the part of the drafters. This would result in a definite
break from Arkansas law that the Study Committee declined to make.
167
Instead, the Study Committee reversed this presumption, so that in the
ATC, a spendthrift provision is presumed to constitute a material purpose.
The 2004 amendments to the UTC placed this subsection in brackets, leav-
ing it up to the states as to whether to adopt it, since two enacting states
deleted it 168 and two, like Arkansas, reversed it.1
69
EXAMPLE: Settlor S establishes an irrevocable trust that is adminis-
tered by Trustee T, and provides educational expenses for his two chil-
dren A and B. S becomes incapacitated and a conservator is appointed
for him. A and B hold advanced degrees and wish to terminate the trust.
S's conservator objects. What result? ANSWER: Since the material pur-
pose of the trust has been fulfilled, S's conservator's consent is not nec-
essary, and the court should order the trust's termination.
EXAMPLE: Settlor S establishes an irrevocable spendthrift trust that is
administered by Trustee T, and provides income for his two children A
and B. S becomes incapacitated and a conservator is appointed for him.
A and B have income of their own and wish to terminate the trust. S's
conservator objects. What result? ANSWER: The ATC makes a spend-
thrift provision a material purpose of the trust; therefore, S's conserva-
tor's consent is necessary for termination.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. UTC § 411(c) (2001) (emphasis added).
167. Letter from Tom Womnack, Chair, Arkansas Bar Association Probate and Trust
Section Study Committee on the Uniform Trust Code, to Scott Stafford, Professor of Law
and Chair, Arkansas Bar Association Jurisprudence and Law Reform Committee (Apr. 26,
2004) (on file with the author).
168. Missouri and Tennessee omitted it. Kansas and Nebraska reversed the presumption
SID 'hat a spexndthnix' pmoislen, is pitsimtd W t a MMatia pruviSioiN. KAN. SN. ANN
58a-41 l(c) (Supp. 2003); NEBR. REV. STAT. § 30-3837 (c) (LEXIS Supp. 2004).
169. 2004 Amendments to be Approved in August, UTC NoTEs, Summer 2004, at 5, 7,
www.utcproject.org/utc/uploads/UTCnotesJul04_print.pdf. The proposed amendments
show that originally deletion of the subsection was planned. However, the final amendments
merely bracket the subsection.
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Finally, Section 411 (e) 170 provides that even if all of the beneficiaries
do not consent to a modification of the trust, the court can approve it any-
way if a two-pronged test is passed: first, the other conditions for modifica-
tion or termination must be met, and second, the interests of the non-
consenting beneficiary will be adequately protected.
171
EXAMPLE: A testamentary trust pays a fixed income to Settlor's chil-
dren A and B and Settlor's friend F for life, with the remainder to charity
C. C, A and B petition the court to discontinue the trust. F and Trustee T
refuse to consent to termination. What result? ANSWER: In order for
this trust to be terminated, a court will have to find that, first, if F had
agreed, the trust could have been terminated (yes); and second, that if
the trust is terminated, F's interest will be adequately protected. F's in-
terest could be protected, for example, by the purchase of an annuity. A
court could so order and terminate the trust. T does not have veto power,
although T has standing to object. Section 411 strikes a balance between
the desire of the beneficiaries to modify or terminate a noncharitable
trust and the settlor's material purpose. Section 412172 applies to both
charitable and noncharitable trusts and codifies the doctrine of "equita-
ble deviation," which empowers a court to modify either the administra-
tive or dispositive terms of a trust, or even to terminate it, if, because of
circumstances unforeseen by the settlor, this will further the purposes of
the trust. In theory, equitable deviation should become more frequent
given the modem trend of the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities
and the establishment of perpetual trusts. 17 3 Arkansas has already codi-
fied the doctrine of equitable deviation, and the ATC cross-references
readers to the relevant code sections. 174 The Study Committee originally
planned to repeal 28-69-401 et seq. and replace them with the ATC, but
after considerable discussion, the Committee retained both versions. The
current procedures are used extensively, and the Study Committee
members believed that if attorneys wished to continue to do so and made
170. See supra note 153 for the text of the section.
171. See UTC § 411 cmt. (2001) for a discussion of types of protection.
172. This section reads as follows:
(a) In addition to the procedure available under §§ 28-69-401-28-69-403, a court
may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate the
trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or
termination will further the purposes of the trust. To the extent practicable, the
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor's probable intention.
(b) A court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the
trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the
trust's administration.
(c) Upon termination of a trust under this section, the trustee shall distribute the
trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust.
ATC § 28-73-412.
173. See Chester, supra note 143, at 701-03.
174. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-69-401-28-69-403 (LEXIS 2004).
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it clear in their pleadings, that this would not cause a problem.175 The
current Arkansas statutes allow for the application of other law, 176 so
seemingly attorneys could choose between the ATC procedure and the
existing procedure. The ATC is broader, so it will apply in more in-
stances.
EXAMPLE (undeT the ATC): A testamentary trust pays A and B, cous-
ins, income on a quarterly basis. At the death of A and B, the trust will
terminate and be paid out to their issue, as yet unborn, or to charity C if
there is no issue. The trustee T does not have the power to invade the
principal. A becomes disabled, and to carry out the settlor's primary
purpose, T should be given the power to invade the principal on A's be-
half. A, B or Tcan petition the court to modify the trust terms to allow T
to invade the principal. The court can do so.
EXAMPLE (under Section 28-69-401): A testamentary trust pays A and
B, cousins, income on a quarterly basis. At the death of A and B, the
trust will terminate and be paid out to their issue, as yet unborn, or to
charity C. The trustee T does not have the power to invade the principal.
A becomes disabled, and to carry out the settlor's primary purpose, T
should be given the power to invade the principal on A's behalf. A, B or
T can petition the court to modify the trust terms to allow T to invade the
principal. The court must first make a finding that the trust's purposes
are not being fulfilled because of circumstances unforeseen by the
settlor. A, B and C must agree to the modification. A guardian ad litem
must be appointed for the unborn remaindermen and must agree. Since
the settlor is deceased, the court can agree on her behalf. The court need
not be stopped by the objection of the guardian ad litem if there is a
finding that there is general family benefit to the living. But A, B, and C
must consent.
Section 413177 codifies and expands the equitable doctrine of"cy pres,"
which applies to the modification of charitable trusts. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court has used the following definition of cy pres:
175. E-mail from William Haught, member, Arkansas Bar Association Probate and Trust
Section Study Committee on the Uniform Trust Code, to Lynn Foster (Dec. 15, 2004) (on
file with author).
176. "Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent revocation, modification, or termination of
a trust pursuant to its terms, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-69-403 (LEXIS 2004).
177. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, if a particular
charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or
wasteful:
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's successors
in interest; and
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[T]he cy pres doctrine is: '... . the principle that equity will, when a char-
ity originally or later becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfill-
ment, substitute another charitable object which is believed to approach
the original purpose as closely as possible. It is the theory that equity has
the power to mould the charitable trust to meet emergencies."
178
Another element often found in the definition of cy pres is that the
settlor have a general (not a specific) charitable purpose or intent. 179 Often
proving "general charitable intent" is difficult.' 80 Easing the application of
cy pres, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts presumes the presence of general
charitable intent, 181 as does the ATC. Thus, if the trust fails because a par-
ticular charitable purpose has become impossible or impracticable to
achieve, and if the trust does not contain a gift over provision, a court can
find general charitable intent and apply cy pres more easily.
(3) a court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing
that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a
manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes.
(b) A provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in distribution
of the trust property to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power of a
court under subsection (a) of this section to apply cy pres to modify or terminate
the trust only if, when the provision takes effect:
(1) The trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor is still living;
or
(2) Less than thirty (30) years have elapsed since the date of the trust's
creation.
ATC § 28-73-413.
178. Trevathan v. Ringgold-Noland Found., Inc. 241 Ark. 758, 763, 410 S.W.2d 132,
135 (1967) (quoting GEORGE BOGERT, 2A THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1953)).
171. If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is
or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if
the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes,
the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to some charita-
ble purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
180. In most Arkansas cases that have discussed the cy pres doctrine, the doctrine is
usually applied with no discussion of the "general charitable intent" element. However, for
an example of a case where a court used the cy pres analysis and could not find general or
"dominant" intent, see Sloan v. Robert Jack Post No. 1322 V.F.W., 218 Ark. 917, 239
S.W.2d 591 (1951) (holding that where the public donated money to two different veterans
organizations to be used for a "veterans' hut" and the outcome would be either a building
only for veterans who had foreign service or a community building to admit non-veterans,
the court refused to apply the cy pres analysis but did not find the intent to be general enough
to encompass either alternative, and ordered the money refunded). See also McCarroll v.
Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F., 154 Ark. 376, 394, 243 S.W. 870, 876 (1922) (dissenting opinion)
(arguing that the decedent had no general charitable intent and thus the majority was wrong
to apply the cy pres doctrine).
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67, Reporter's Notes (2001).
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Even if the trust contains a noncharitable gift over provision, subsec-
tion (b) only allows it to prevail over the court's cy pres power in two nar-
row circumstances.' 82 This is another expansion of cy pres. The cy pres doc-
trine has a laudable underlying policy: that of supporting charitable gifts. It
has been criticized for its narrowness.' 83 The ATC will provide much-
needed reforms.
Section 414184 addresses the problem of the trust that does not consist
of enough property to carry out the purpose of the testator, or even to justify
the cost of its own administration. Many trusts contain provisions that allow
the trustee to terminate the trust if its continued existence becomes uneco-
nomical. The ATC codifies the "bottom amount" at $100,000--if the trust
property has total value of less than $100,000, the trustee or court may ter-
minate the trust, or the trustee can be changed, presumably to one that is
less expensive. Also note that this section does not require court approval if
the beneficiaries do not object.
Section 415185 allows courts to reform the terms of a trust to carry out
the settlor's intent if clear and convincing evidence is produced to show that
there was a mistake of fact or law. This is a change from Arkansas law
186
although it accords with the Restatement (Third) of Property Section 12.1.
The statute applies to the full spectrum of mistakes-mistakes of law, of
182. See supra note 177 for the text of the section.
183. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts:
Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAw. L. REv. 353 (1999) (arguing that the
cy pres doctrine is too narrow, has been misused by the courts, and should be merged with
the doctrine of equitable deviation); Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?.- The Search for
Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 41 (1989)
(recommending that the requirement of general charitable intent be dropped and that non-
charitable gift-overs be regarded less favorably).
184. This section reads as follows:
(a) After notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the trustee of a trust consisting of
trust property having a total value less than one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) may terminate the trust if the trustee concludes that the value of the
trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of administration.
(b) A court may modify or terminate a trust or remove the trustee and appoint a
different trustee if it determines that the value of the trust property is insufficient
to justify the cost of administration.
(c) Upon termination of a trust under this section, the trustee shall distribute the
trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust.
(d) This section does not apply to an easement for conservation or preservation.
ATC § 28-73-414.
185. ATC § 28-73-415 (reading as follows: "A court may reform the terms of a trust,
even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear
and convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected
by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.")
186. "But the courts do not possess the prerogative power of creating trusts or of altering
the terms of instruments creating them." Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 476, 162 S.W. 69, 71
(1913).
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fact, in expression, 187 and in inducement. 188 The Comment to this section
distinguishes "reformation" from the "resolution of ambiguities." However,
the case law in this area is often confusing. Because common law prohibited
almost all reformation of wills and trusts for mistake, 89 yet allowed the
resolution of some ambiguities, 190 attorneys tend to argue ambiguity. 19' The
ATC will bring some needed flexibility to courts in this regard. However,
adoption of this section may cause some tension between the law of wills
and that of testamentary trusts, since the law of wills is not changing.
Section 416192 of the ATC also allows courts to modify the terms of a
trust to achieve the settlor's tax objectives.
EXAMPLE: Settlor S establishes an inter vivos revocable trust, provid-
ing that on her death the trust residue will be distributed to charity A.
The trust agreement does not provide for exoneration of the residue from
taxes and expenses. Similar trusts of S give similar gifts to other chari-
ties, and each of them provides for exoneration. The trustee petitions the
court for modification and introduces evidence of S's intent. The court
can modify the trust and provide for exoneration.
187. "A mistake of expression occurs when the terms of the trust misstate the settlor's
intention, fail to include a term that was intended to be included, or include a term that was
not intended to be included." UTC § 415 cmt. (2001). For example, if settlor wanted A to
receive $500,000 at the termination of the trust and the trust gave $50,000 to A, this would
be a mistake of expression.
188. "A mistake in the inducement occurs when the terms of the trust accurately reflect
what the settlor intended to be included or excluded but this intention was based on a mistake
of fact or law." Id. For examples of mistakes in inducement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY, WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. i illustrations (2003).
189. Generally, a will may not be set aside for mistake where the testator knew and ap-
proved its contents .... Some courts, however, have created an exception. When the grounds
upon which the testator proceeded in revoking a bequest appear in the instrument itself, some
courts allow parol evidence to show that the error upon which the revocation was based is the
nonexistence of that fact, and refuse to allow the revocation .... Even so, when the mis-
statement is one which is peculiarly within the testator's knowledge or determination, the
falsity of such assertion will not prevent the operation of the clause of revocation.
Witt v. Rosen, 298 Ark. 187, 189-91, 765 S.W.2d 956, 957-59 (1989) (declining to reform
the will in question).
190. See Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 584-85, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958) (explaining the
doctrine of allowing extrinsic evidence to resolve latent, but not patent, ambiguities with
respect to a will). No Arkansas trust law cases exist on the issues of reformation and resolu-
tion of ambiguities.
191. "Although the courts subscribe to an inflexible rule against reformation of a will, it
seems that they have often strained a point in matters of identification of property or benefi-
ciaries in order to reach a desired result by way of construction." In re Gibbs' Estate, 14 Wis.
2d 490, 497, 111 N.W.2d 413, 418 (1961) (refusing to call a mistake an ambiguity, and re-
forming the will anyway).
192. This section reads as follows: "To achieve the settlor's tax objectives, a court may
modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor's probable intention.
The court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect." ATC § 28-73-416.
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No current Arkansas law exists on this topic other than Arkansas's
codification of the Claflin rule already discussed, which is not so specific.'
93
Section 417194 allows trustees to combine or divide trusts, subject to any
contrary provision in the trust, if the result does not harm any beneficiaries.
The section refers readers to a corresponding statute already in force,1
95
which also concern the division of trusts. Neither the ATC nor the existing
Arkansas statutes require judicial approval. The Arkansas statutes are
somewhat more detailed with respect to the division of trusts.' 96 Division of
trusts is fairly common and is usually undertaken for tax purposes.' 97 Com-
bination of trusts may enable more efficient or less expensive administra-
tion, and may cure the problem of an uneconomic trust.198
VII. ARTICLE 5--CREDITOR'S CLAIMS: SPENDTHRIFT AND
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
Article 5 covers the rights of creditors of either settlors or beneficiaries
to reach trust property. There are two modem trends with regard to credi-Itors' rights against trusts. The first is the erosion of the spendthrift trust's
protection against creditors. Both the Restatements (Second) and (Third) of
Trusts allow a spendthrift trust to be reached by a creditor if the claim is one
for alimony and child support; necessary services or supplies for the benefit
of the beneficiary; services and materials furnished to preserve or benefit
the beneficiary's interest in the trust (e.g., an attorney's services); or lastly if
the creditor is the United States or a state. 199 The UTC recognizes all of
these exceptions except claims for necessities; 200 the ATC recognizes none
of them, although it does not expressly exclude them.20 1 A fifth category of
193. ARK. CoDE ANN. § 28-69-401 (LEXIS 2004).
194. This section reads as follows:
(a) (1) After notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a trustee may combine two (2)
or more trusts into a single trust or divide a trust into two (2) or more separate
trusts, if the result does not impair rights of any beneficiary or adversely affect
achievement of the purposes of the trust.
(2) A trustee may exercise the authority granted in this section without
court approval.
(b) This section does not repeal §§ 28-69-701-28-69-706.
ATC § 28-73-417.
195. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-69-705-28-69-706 (LEXIS 2004).
196. For example, current Arkansas law allows the divided trusts to contain dissimilar
terms. Differing tax elections may be made for each. Id. § 28-69-705.
197. UTC § 417 cmt. (200t).
198. Id.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 59 (2001).
200. UTC § 503 (2001).
201. See discussion infra at notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
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such creditors, tort claimants, is just now appearing on the horizon. Al-
though finding favor in some quarters, tort claimants are not included as
exceptions in either the UTC or the ATC.2°2
The second modem trend allows the settlor/beneficiary of a self settled
trust to protect her trust assets from her own creditors. These "asset protec-
tion trusts" began their existence in off-shore jurisdictions and have now
been legalized in several states. 2 3 The ATC follows traditional law and
rejects asset protection trusts.204
Another limiting factor on transfers into trust is Arkansas's Fraudulent
Transfer Act, 20 5 which is outside the scope of this article, but which may
apply to both self settled trusts and gratuitous trusts for the benefit of an-
other.
A. Rights When No Spendthrift Provision-Section 501206
This section clarifies that a court order obtained by a creditor against a
trustee may extend to future distributions. Courts or statutes (Arkansas has
no such statutes) may limit creditors to specified percentages or other re-
strictions. Note that the ATC extends a creditor's right to reach distributions
"for the benefit of' as well as "to" the beneficiary, subject to the court's
discretion. The ATC uses the word "attachment" in this section to describe
the method of reaching trust assets. Arkansas does not currently recognize
the prejudgment remedy of attachment.20 7 To reach trust assets in Arkansas,
a creditor must garnish or execute on the trustee after obtaining a judg-
ment.208
202. See generally Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the
Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002)
(discussing the policy considerations that led to the resulting UTC statutes),
203. See infra the definition and discussion of asset protection trusts at notes 240-48 and
accompanying text.
204. UTC § 505 cmt. (2001).
205. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201-4-59-213 (LEXIS 2001).
206. This section reads as follows:
To the extent a beneficiary's interest is not protected by a spendthrift provision, a
court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the benefi-
ciary's interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the bene-
fit of the beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the award to such relief
as is appropriate under the circumstances,
ATC § 28-73-501.
207. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988) (holding Arkansas
prejudgment attachment statute unconstitutional).
208. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-110-401-417 (LEXIS 1999) (writs of garnishment); Id. §§
16-66-101-507 (writs of execution, levy, and sale).
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B. Spendthrift Provision-Section 502209
This section allows the phrase "spendthrift trust" or similar wording to
be sufficient to restrain both voluntary2 10 and involuntary transfers21' of the
beneficiary's interest. A spendthrift provision must restrain both types of
transfers to be valid. The ATC codifies the common law that a beneficiary
may not transfer an interest in a spendthrift trust, and a creditor or assignee
of a beneficiary may not reach the interest before the beneficiary receives
it.2 12 A spendthrift trust valid under the ATC will also be recognized as
valid in bankruptcy proceedings.213 Beneficiaries may disclaim property or
release or exercise powers of appointment with no restrictions because these
actions are not "transfers" of property and thus are not affected by a spend-
thrift clause.2
14
C. Arkansas Omission from the UTC-UTC Section 503
In accord with the modem trend of case and statutory law and the Re-
statements (Second) and (Third) of Trusts,2'5 section 503 of the UTC allows
spouses, former spouses, or children of the beneficiary who have a judg-
ment or court order for support or maintenance, or judgment creditors who
have provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in the
trust (for example, lawyers), to reach spendthrift trust distributions. A sec-
ond subsection renders spendthrift provisions invalid against state and fed-
209. This section reads as follows:
(a) A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and invol-
untary transfer of a beneficiary's interest.
(b) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held subject to
a "spendthrift trust," or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest.
(c) A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a valid
spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a creditor
or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by the
trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.
ATC § 28-73-502.
210. A voluntary transfer, for example, would be a beneficiary's assignment of her inter-
est to a creditor to voluntarily pay off a debt.
211. An example of an involuntary transfer would be a levy of execution on the trustee
by a judgment creditor of the beneficiary.
212. Med. Park Hosp. v. Bancorpsouth Bank of Hope, 2004 WL 965927 (Ark. No. 03-
1199 May 6, 2004); Bowlin v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S.W. 288
(1917). Note, however, that this limitation on creditors does not apply to self-settled spend-
thrift trusts. See infra note 232 for the text of section 505.
213. UTC § 502 cmt.
214. Id.
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(a) (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 157(a) (1959).
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eral government claims. The ATC omits all of UTC section 503.216 The
members of the Study Committee believed that "recognition of the excep-
tions allowed by the original section 503 would amount to a change in what
is believed to be existing Arkansas law. ''217 However, Arkansas already has
case law to the effect of UTC section 503(b), which allows a former spouse
with a judgment for alimony to reach a spendthrift trust.218 In Council v.
Owens, the divorced wife of a trust beneficiary received a judgment for a
debt of $26,800 in unpaid alimony and claimed a right to the beneficiary's
trust interest. The trustee sued for a declaratory judgment. The trust had a
spendthrift provision, but the trustee was required to pay annual distribu-
tions to the ex-husband. The Court of Appeals decided, in accord with the
"prevailing view" of cases in other jurisdictions, and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts, which the Arkansas Supreme Court follows, that as a last
resort the ex-wife could garnish the trust, stating, "In sum, we find that the
legal obligation for support, regardless of whether it is for alimony or child
support, is more compelling and outweighs the intent of the settlor to shelter
the beneficiary's interest in the trust.'
2 19
The chair of the Study Committee has stated that it is not the intent of
the Committee to weaken Council v. Owens,220 but if the section does not
become law, how can the legislature's rejection of this section not have that
effect? A compelling argument can certainly be made that if the legislature
refuses to enact a provision, it is because it does not wish the content of that
provision to become statutory law. If the spouse and child portion of section
503 was adopted, to better coincide with the opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals, language could be inserted to require the creditor to exhaust all other
avenues before proceeding against a trust.
216. Arkansas is not alone in its omission of this section. Kansas and Maine also omit it.
The District of Columbia allows only children to reach spendthrift trusts. D.C. CODE ANN. §
19-1305.03(b) (LEXIS Supp. 2004). Tennessee allows only the state of Tennessee the excep-
tion. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-503 (2004). Utah and Wyoming allow all categories of
creditors except for spouses and former spouses. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-503 (LEXIS Supp.
2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-503 (Michie 2004). Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire
and New Mexico retain the same categories of creditors as does the UTC.
217. Letter from Tom Womack, supra note 167.
218. Council v. Owens, 28 Ark. App. 49, 770 S.W.2d 193 (1989).
219. Id. at 55, 770 S.W.2d at 197.
220. Tom Womack, Presentation on the Proposed Arkansas Trust Code, 2004 Arkansas
Bar Association Probate Law Institute (Oct. 29, 2004).
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D. Discretionary and Support Trusts-ATC Section 504221
Under the ATC, a creditor cannot compel a trustee to make a distribu-
tion that is within the trustee's discretion. As the Comment explains, this
section "eliminates the distinction between discretionary and support trusts,
unifying the rules for all trusts fitting within either of the former catego-
,,222
ries. Section 504 applies whether or not the trust has a spendthrift provi-
sion, although as the Comment notes, this section is not relevant to a trust
with a spendthrift provision. It applies even if the discretion is expressed in
the form of a standard, and even if the trustee has abused the discretion. It
does not, however, prevent a beneficiary from going to court because a trus-
tee has failed to comply with a standard or abused its discretion.
223
EXAMPLE: A trust allows Trustee T to distribute income and principal
to B, at T's discretion, for B's "support" (support is a standard). The trust
does not contain a spendthrift provision. C obtains a judgment against B
and B's Other property is insufficient to satisfy the judgment. C gar-
nishes the trust. T stops making payments to B. Can C compel pay-
ments? ANSWER: No, not even if T has abused her discretion.
In July 2004, NCCUSL amended section 504 and added a new subsec-
tion that prevents creditors from reaching the interest of a beneficiary who
is also a trustee or co-trustee if the trustee/beneficiary's discretion to make
distributions for her own benefit is limited by an "ascertainable standard.
' 224
The definition of this term was removed from section 814 and added to the
221. This section reads as follows:
(a) Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a benefi-
ciary may not compel a distribution that is subject to the trustee's discretion,
even if:
(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution; or
(2) the trustee has abused the discretion.
(b) This section does not limit the right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial
proceeding against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a
standard for distribution. Under § 26-78-814(a), a trustee must always exercise a
discretionary power in good faith and with regard to the purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries.
(c) A creditor may not reach the interest of a beneficiary who is also a trustee or
co-trustee, or otherwise compel a distribution, if the trustee's discretion to make
distributions for the trustee's own benefit is limited by an ascertainable standard.
ATC § 28-73-504.
222. UTC § 504 cmt. For more on this point, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60
reporter's notes to cmt. a (2001).
223. Again, note that this section does not apply to self-settled trusts. See infra note 232
(discussing section 505 and this issue).
224. An ascertainable standard is one "relating to the trustee's individual health, educa-
tion, support or maintenance within the meaning of Section 2041(b)(1)(A) or 2514(c)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code ... " ATC § 28-73-814.
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definitions in section 103. This amendment is intended to clarify the law
with respect to "bypass trusts" in which the settlor's spouse is often both a
beneficiary and a trustee. An "ascertainable standard" takes the property in
the trust out of the beneficiary/trustee's estate for estate tax purposes.225
This section of the UTC has also stirred some controversy. At least one
commentator has accused the abolition of the distinction between discre-
tionary and support trusts as enabling government agencies to garnish "dis-
ability trusts" 226 and "special needs trusts., 227 The argument is that if a trust
does not contain special needs language, but the common law of its state
allows it to operate as a disability or special needs trust, then the abolition of
the difference between support and discretionary trusts will allow the gov-
ernment to reach the trust assets.228 Other commentators are more sanguine
with regard to the existence of disability trusts and special needs trusts un-
der the UTC.229 A Colorado committee "co-chaired by a leading special
needs trust expert" concluded that the UTC would have no impact on either
type of trusts created by third parties. 230 Therefore at the present time, the
NCCUSL has not amended the UTC in this regard, but is watching the
231
situation.
225. See generally Richard W. Harris, Ascertainable Standard Restrictions of Trust Pow-
ers under the Estate, Gift, and Income Tax, 50 TAX LAW. 489 (1997) (discussing the nature
of ascertainable standards, and exploring their different treatment by different types of taxes).
This issue of taxation of trusts and powers of appointment is beyond the scope of this article.
226. The phrase "disability trusts" is used in this article to denote trusts established to
qualify persons over 65 for government health benefits. These types of trusts may vary
somewhat from state to state but generally they cap the income available and provide that at
the income beneficiary's death the trust will reimburse the state for Medicaid expenses. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(B) (2000).
227. "Special needs trusts" are established to qualify persons under sixty-five with cer-
tain disabilities for government health benefits. These types of trusts may vary somewhat
from state to state as well. In general, they seek to preserve the beneficiary's eligibility for
government health benefits but also enhance their quality of life. At the income beneficiary's
death the trust will reimburse the state for Medicaid expenses. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
228. Mark Merric & Douglas W. Stein, A Threat to All SNTs, TR. & EST., Nov. 2004, at
38.
229. Alan Newman states that "a provider of Medicaid or other public benefits to a bene-
ficiary of a discretionary trust created by a third party, including one with support or other
standards for distributions [which would include a special needs trust], will be unable to
force distributions from the trust that it could reach to reimburse it for benefits it had pro-
vided to the beneficiary." see Newman supra 202, at 812. He cautions that such a trust
should also contain a spendthrift provision. ld. at 812 n.223. However, he notes that arguably
public support providers could argue take into account trust assets, thus denying Medicaid
eligibility to beneficiaries, and that this denial is not prohibited under the UTC. Id. at 813.
230. Legislative Update 2004, supra note 158, at 2.
231. Id. at 3.
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E. Creditors' Rights Against Settlors-Section 505232
Can the creditor of a settlor reach trust assets? The answer depends on
whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable. Subsection (a)(1) affirms the
modem rule with respect to revocable trusts that a creditor can reach trust
assets, since they are essentially under the settlor's control by virtue of her
power of revocation. In most trusts of this type, the settlor has reserved a
beneficial interest. This was the case in Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Fam-
ily Trust.233 The settlor had transferred his own and his company's assets
into a revocable trust.234 He was a co-trustee and the sole lifetime benefici-
ary.235 The Arkansas Court of Appeals ruled that not only were the transfers
into the trust void under the fraudulent transfer statute, but also the trust
itself was void with respect to the creditor. 36
Additionally, the UTC extends creditors' rights to a revocable trust af-
ter the settlor's death,237 but the Study Committee declined to change exist-
238 ta twing Arkansas law, stating that it was well settled and not in need of
change.239
232. This section reads as follows:
(a) Whether or not the terms of a trust contain a spendthrift provision, the fol-
lowing rules apply:
(1) during the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is sub-
ject to claims of the settlor's creditors.
(2) with respect to an irrevocable trust, a creditor or assignee of the settlor
may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the
settlor's benefit. If a trust has more than one settlor, the amount the creditor
or assignee of a particular settlor may reach may not exceed the settlor's in-
terest in the portion of the trust attributable to that settlor's contribution.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) during the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of
withdrawal is treated in the same manner as the settlor of a revocable trust
to the extent of the property subject to the power; and
(2) upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power, the holder is treated as
the settlor of the trust only to the extent the value of the property affected
by the lapse, release, or waiver exceeds the greater of the amount specified
in Section 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or
Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, in each case as in
effect on January 1, 2005.
ATC § 28-73-505.
233. Halliburton Company v. E.H. Owen Family Trust, 28 Ark. App. 314, 773 S.W.2d
453 (1989).
234. Id. at 316, 773 S.W.2d 454.
235. Id., 773 S.W.2d at 454.
236. Id. at 324-25, 773 S.W.2d at 458-59.
237. UTC § 505(a)(3).
238. "[W]ithin two (2) months after his or her qualification or as the court may direct, a
personal representative shall file a true and complete inventory of all property owned by the
decedent at the time of his or her death, except such interests as terminated by reason of his
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Subsection 505(a)(2) prevents settlors from establishing "asset protec-
tion" trusts, following Arkansas and the majority, although not the modem
trend. Creditors may reach as much of the self-settled trust assets as the
settlor/beneficiary is entitled to.
EXAMPLE: Settlor S creates an irrevocable trust with herself as the life-
time income beneficiary, and her children as the remainder beneficiaries.
The trust contains a spendthrift provision. S's creditors can reach as
much of the trust property as can S, that is, her income.
240The asset protection trust is a fairly recent phenomenon. It first sur-
faced offshore, is now available in 18 countries, 241 and has spread to Alaska,
Delaware, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and Utah.242 The
United States jurisdictions that have enacted asset protection trust statutes
have in general abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities, abrogated the
common law rule denying self settled trust beneficiaries protection from
creditors, and provided a favorable no-income tax environment for such
trusts. 243 In this type of a trust,244 at least one trustee must be present in the
host state; the trust instrument must choose the law of the host state; some
or all of the trust administration must be performed in the host state; and
245some or all of the trust property must be located within the trust state.
or her death. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-49-1 10(a)(1). Of the ten jurisdictions that have en-
acted the UTC, only Missouri has similarly deleted this subsection.
239. Letter from Tom Womack, supra note 167.
240. For an introduction to both offshore and domestic asset protection trusts, see gener-
ally Henry J. Lischer, Domestic Asset Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability? 35 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 479 (2000). Academic commentators have almost unanimously criticized asset
protection trusts. See generally Stuart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to
the Bottom? 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000); Randall A. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to "Asset
Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987 (1999). In a now-often-cited article, Professor
Lynn LoPucki lists asset protection trusts as one factor contributing to the possible failure of
the system by which money judgments are enforced. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liabil-
ity, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-38 (1996).
241. Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and Channel Islands are just a few of the juris-
dictions that offer asset protection trusts.
242. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (LEXIS 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505.3 (West, Westlaw through 2d
Reg. Sess. of 92d Gen. Assembly (2004)) NEV. REV. STAT. 166.040-166.120 (West 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 31, §§ 10-18 (West, Westlaw through end of 2004 Session); (R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2 (Lexis 2000). For a comparison of the legislation of some of these
states and a thorough treatment of the history and policy debates concerning APTs, see gen-
erally Lischer, supra note 240.
243. Lischer, supra note 240, at 508.
244. The following description focuses on domestic asset protection trusts as opposed to
those in foreign jurisdictions. For a description of typical offshore asset protection trusts, see
id. at 506-08.
245. Id. at 516.
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Trustees may be authorized to make discretionary distributions to
settlor/beneficiaries; settlor/beneficiaries may veto distributions to them-
selves, and settlor/beneficiaries may be given testamentary special powers
of appointment over the trust property.246
A lengthy discussion of APTs is outside the scope of this article.
Settlor/beneficiaries of offshore APTs have not fared well in the handful of
United States court cases existing at this time.247 Domestic APTs are so new
that as of this writing, not a single published opinion exists in which they
are at issue, but commentators have raised some serious grounds on which
to attack them.
248
F. Creditors and Overdue Distributions-Section 506249
What if the trustee simply refuses to distribute trust property? Under
section 504, if the trustee has discretionary powers, a creditor cannot gar-
nish or execute against the property, even if the trustee has abused her dis-
cretion. But if the distribution is mandatory and a reasonable time has
elapsed after the distribution was supposed to occur, this section clarifies
that creditors can reach the amount of the distribution, whether or not the
trust contains a spendthrift provision.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (affirming a bankruptcy
judge's contempt order against a debtor for refusing to turn over assets of an offshore APT,
and applying Florida law and not the law of Mauritius); F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179
F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming a district court judge's contempt order against a couple
for refusing to turn over assets of offshore APT when sued for fraud); Breitenstine v. Breit-
enstine, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003) (affirming finding that offshore APT was created to de-
fraud creditors, including ex-wife).
248. No matter where the creditor sues, violation of fraudulent transfer laws may work,
particularly if the transfer is made in connection with the creditor's claim. If the creditor sues
under the law of a sister state without an APT statute (e.g. Arkansas), the creditor can argue
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution applies to the Arkan-
sas judgment, and because APTs are against the strong public policy of Arkansas, the Arkan-
sas judgment should prevail over the law of the APT state. For a fuller discussion of methods
to attack APTs, see Duncan E. Osborne, Jack E. Owen, Jr., & Arthur T. Catterall, Possibili-
ties and Limitations of Asset Protection 355-361 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 20-25,
2004), WL SJ066 ALI-ABA 323. For a practitioner's view of the academy's attack on such
trusts, see id. at 331-33.
249. This section reads as follows: "Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provi-
sion, a creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach a mandatory distribution of income or
principal, including a distribution upon termination of the trust, if the trustee has not made
the distribution to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the designated distribution
date." ATC § 28-73-506.
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G. Creditors of the Trustee-Section 507250
This section affirms the common law that trust property cannot be
reached by creditors of the trustee under any circumstances. The Comment
notes that it is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.251
VIII. ARTICLE 6-REVOCABLE TRUSTS
Revocable trusts have increased in popularity, chiefly as a substitute
for wills, but the law has not kept up. The UTC drafters view Article 6 as
"one of the more important articles of the Code., 252 The drafters have at-
tempted to settle issues still in question under common law. It is in this arti-
cle that the common law presumption of irrevocability of a trust is reversed.
A. The Settlor's Capacity-Section 601253
This section codifies current Arkansas case law, stating that the capac-
ity to create a revocable trust is the same as that required to make a will.
This is logical, since most revocable trusts are will substitutes. 54
250. This section reads as follows: "Trust property is not subject to personal obligations
of the trustee, even if the trustee becomes insolvent or bankrupt." ATC § 28-73-507.
251. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d).
252. UTC Art. 6 general cmt.
253. This section reads as follows: "The capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or
add property to a revocable trust, or to direct the actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is
the same as that required to make a will." ATC § 28-73-601.
254. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussing section 402).
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B. Presumption Reversal-Toward Revocable-Section 602255
Section 602 reverses the common law presumption, followed by Ar-
kansas, that a trust instrument that is silent will be presumed to be irrevoca-
ble.256 However, this presumption only applies if the trust was executed
after the ATC is adopted. In the opinion of the Study Conmittee, this is the
most important change that the UTC makes to Arkansas trust law.257 Section
602 also sets out the methods for revoking or amending a trust. Arkansas
law in this area is sparse; this section will be a particularly good addition.
255. This section reads as follows:
(a) Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust is irrevocable, the
settlor may revoke or amend the trust. This subsection does not apply to a trust
created under an instrument executed before September 1, 2005.
(b) If a revocable trust is created or funded by more than one settlor:
(1) to the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may be
revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint
action of both spouses; and
(2) to the extent the trust consists of property other than community prop-
erty, each settlor may revoke or amend the trust with regard to the portion
of the trust property attributable to that settlor's contribution; and
(3) upon the revocation or amendment of the trust by fewer than all of the
settlors, the trustee shall promptly notify the other settlors of the revocation
or amendment.
(c) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(1) by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the
trust; or
(2) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided
in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(A) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or
specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed accord-
ing to the terms of the trust; or
(B) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of
the settlor's intent.
(d) Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust prop-
erty as the settlor directs.
(e) A settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of
trust property may be exercised by an agent under a power of attorney only to
the extent expressly authorized by the terms of the trust or the power.
(f) A conservator of the settlor or, if no conservator has been appointed, a guard-
ian of the settlor may exercise a settlor's powers with respect to revocation,
amendment, or distribution of trust property only with the approval of the court
supervising the conservatorship or guardianship.
(g) A trustee who does not know that a trust has been revoked or amended is not
liable to the settlor or settlor's successors in interest for distributions made and
other actions taken on the assumption that the trust had not been amended or re-
voked.
ATC § 28-73-602.
256. Rogoski v. McLaughlin, 228 Ark. 1157, 312 S.W.2d 912 (1958).
257. Letter from Tom Womack, supra note 167.
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C. The Settlor's Powers and Powers of Withdrawal-Section 603258
Since the settlor of a revocable trust essentially retains control of the
trust, this section subjects the rights of beneficiaries and the duties of the
trustee to the settlor who has the power to revoke. What does this mean?
Analogizing a revocable trust to a will, while the settlor has capacity, she
has the same control over the trust that a testator has over a will. Notice that
would normally be given to the beneficiaries must instead be given to the
settlor. Consent required of the beneficiaries for various actions is instead
required of the settlor. This section states that the beneficiaries come into
their rights at the settlor's loss of capacity or death. However, since this is a
default and not a mandatory provision, the trust can be drafted so that the
beneficiaries' rights to information are postponed until the death of the
settlor.259
Section 603 also gives the holder of a power of withdrawal 260 over a
revocable trust the same powers as a settlor. This is logical given a holder's
similar power to control the trUst.
2 6 1
258. This section reads as follows:
(a) While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust,
rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trus-
tee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.
(b) During the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of
withdrawal has the rights of a settlor of a revocable trust under this section to the
extent of the property subject to the power.
ATC § 28-73-603.
259. UTC § 603 cmt. For a clearer explanation, see English, supra note 14, at 187-88.
260. A power of withdrawal is a presently exercisable general power of appointment that
does not depend for its exercise on the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse
interest. ATC § 28-73-103(10).
261. UTC § 603 cmt.
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D. Statutes of Limitation for Trust Contests-Section 604262
As the number of revocable trusts increases, litigation over revocable
trusts will also increase. One question that has not been clearly answered in
many jurisdictions, including Arkansas, concerns the statute of limitations
for contesting the validity of a revocable trust. The ATC sets the limit at the
earlier of three years after the settlor's death or ninety days after the trustee
has sent the plaintiff a copy of the trust instrument and notice as set out in
section 813.
IX. ARTICLE 7--OFFICE OF THE TRUSTEE
Article 7 contains mostly default rules that can be modified by the
terms of a trust. A well-drafted trust will provide for the subjects covered in
this article: acceptance or rejection of a trusteeship; bond; co-trustees; ap-
pointment of successor trustees; removal and resignation of trustees; and so
on. However, if a trust is silent as to any of these issues, a court has ready-
made guidance from the ATC. Additionally, drafters can incorporate these
ATC provisions by reference into the trust. This article is a welcome addi-
tion to Arkansas trust law, which in general does not cover these issues.
Article 7 also adds several new grounds for removal of a trustee, most sig-
nificantly if the qualified beneficiaries unanimously request removal and
certain conditions are met.
262. This section reads as follows:
(a) A person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the validity of a
trust that was revocable at the settlor's death within the earlier of:
(1) three (3) years after the settlor's death; or
(2) ninety (90) days after the trustee sent the person a copy of the trust in-
strument and a notice informing the person of the trust's existence, the
settlor's name, the trustee's name and address, the time allowed for com-
mencing a proceeding, and a description of the beneficiary's interest, if
any.
(b) Upon the death of the settlor of a trust that was revocable at the settlor's
death, the trustee may proceed to distribute the trust property in accordance with
the terms of the trust. The trustee is not subject to liability for the distribution
unless:
(1) the trustee knows of a pending judicial proceeding contesting the valid-
ity of the trust; or
(2) a potential contestant has notified the trustee of a possible judicial pro-
ceeding to contest the trust and a judicial proceeding is commenced within
sixty (60) days after the contestant sent the notification.
(c) A beneficiary of a trust that is determined to have been invalid is liable to re-
turn any distribution received.
ATC § 28-73-604.
[Vol. 27
ARKANSAS TRUST CODE
A. Assuming or Declining the Office and Bond-Sections 701263 and
702264
These sections are fairly straightforward. A trustee can accept office by
a number of means. A potential trustee can investigate the trust property for
potential liability issues before accepting. Even if the trust does not specify
a bond, a court may require one; on the other hand, even if the trust requires
a bond, a bank or trust company licensed in Arkansas need not give it.
263. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person des-
ignated as trustee accepts the trusteeship:
(1) by substantially complying with a method of acceptance provided in the
tetrms of the trust; or
(2) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided
in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by accepting delivery of the
trust property, exercising powers or performing duties as trustee, or other-
wise indicating acceptance of the trusteeship.
(b) A person designated as trustee who has not yet accepted the trusteeship may
reject the trusteeship. A designated trustee who does not accept the trusteeship
within a reasonable time after knowing of the designation is deemed to have re-
jected the trusteeship.
(c) A person designated as trustee, without accepting the trusteeship, may:
(1) act to preserve the trust property if, within a reasonable time after act-
ing, the person sends a rejection of the trusteeship to the settlor or, if the
settlor is dead or lacks capacity, to a qualified beneficiary; and
(2) inspect or investigate trust property to determine potential liability un-
der environmental or other law or for any other purpose.
ATC § 28-73-701.
264. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee shall give bond to secure performance of the trustee's duties only if
a court finds that a bond is needed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries or
is required by the terms of the trust and the court has not dispensed with the re-
quirement.
(b) A court may specify the amount of a bond, its liabilities, and whether sureties
are necessary. A court may modify or terminate a bond at any time.
(c) A regulated financial service institution qualified to do trust business in this
State need not give bond, even if required by the terms of the trust.
ATC § 28-73-702.
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B. Co-Trustees-Section 703265
Co-trustees may be appointed for a variety of reasons: to gain the ad-
vantage of differing skills, or to make certain that different factions of bene-
ficiaries are represented. 266 This section allows co-trustees who are unable
to achieve unanimity to act by majority rule, although a trust instrument can
require otherwise, and in general relieves a dissenting trustee from liability
unless there is a serious breach. It allows the remaining co-trustees to act if
a vacancy occurs or if a co-trustee is unavailable to perform. It allows for
limited delegation by a co-trustee and places a duty on co-trustees to pre-
vent and redress breaches of trust. The UTC drafters advise that co-
trusteeships should not be called for without "careful reflection. 267 Arkan-
sas law attests to that statement. Even with our scarcity of trust law cases
and the total absence of cases on some issues, there are at least five pub-
268lished appellate decisions resulting from co-trustees who could not agree.
265. This section reads as follows:
(a) Co-trustees who are unable to reach a unanimous decision may act by major-
ity decision.
(b) If a vacancy occurs in a co-trusteeship, the remaining co-trustees may act for
the trust.
(c) A co-trustee must participate in the performance of a trustee's function unless
the co-trustee is unavailable to perform the function because of absence, illness,
disqualification under other law, or other temporary incapacity or the co-trustee
has properly delegated the performance of the function to another trustee.
(d) If a co-trustee is unavailable to perform duties because of absence, illness,
disqualification under other law, or other temporary incapacity, and prompt ac-
tion is necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust or to avoid injury to the
trust property, the remaining co-trustee or a majority of the remaining co-
trustees may act for the trust.
(e) A trustee may not delegate to a co-trustee the performance of a function the
settlor reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly. Unless a delegation
was irrevocable, a trustee may revoke a delegation previously made.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a trustee who
does not join in an action of another trustee is not liable for the action.
(g) Each trustee shall exercise reasonable care to:
(1) prevent a co-trustee from committing a serious breach of trust; and
(2) compel a co-trustee to redress a serious breach of trust.
(h) A dissenting trustee who joins in anaction at the direction of the majority of
the trustees and who notified any co-trustee of the dissent at or before the time of
the action is not liable for the action unless the action is a serious breach of trust.
ATC § 28-73-703.
266. UTC § 703 cmt.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Selig v. Morrison, 230 Ark. 216, 321 S.W.2d 769 (1959) (affirming the
appointment of a trustee ad litem to conduct trust litigation because the co-trustees couldn't
get along); Festinger v. Kantor, 272 Ark. 411, 616 S.W.2d 455 (1981) (affirming removal of
co-trustees because of hostility among family members).
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Under common law, trustees of a private trust were required to act in
unanimity, although trustees of a charitable trust could act by majority
vote. 2 69 Again, Arkansas law on this topic is sparse. The common law rule is
cited by the dissent in one Supreme Court case.270 Allowing action by a
majority brings trust law in line with Arkansas statutory law regarding co-
executors, which allows action by majority vote.2 7'
C. Vacancies in Trusteeships-Section 704272
This section states the various ways in which a trusteeship may be-
come vacant, and sets out default rules for fulfilling the vacancy. Categories
of substitute trustees are prioritized. Note that if a noncharitable trust does
not name a successor trustee, next in priority is a person appointed by
unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries-another example of
269. UTC § 703 cmt. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 194, 383 (1959)).
270. Selig, 230 Ark. at 223, 321 S.W.2d at 774 (Smith, J., dissenting).
271. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-48-104 (LEXIS 2004).
272. This section reads as follows:
(a) A vacancy in a trusteeship occurs if:
(1) a person designated as trustee rejects the trusteeship;
(2) a person designated as trustee cannot be identified or does not exist;
(3) a trustee resigns;
(4) a trustee is disqualified or removed;
(5) a trustee dies; or
(6) a guardian of the person or conservator is appointed for an individual
serving as trustee.
(b) If one or more co-trustees remain in office, a vacancy in a trusteeship need
not be filled. A vacancy in a trusteeship must be filled if the trust has no remain-
ing trustee.
(c) A vacancy in a trusteeship of a non-charitable trust that is required to be
filled must be filled in the following order of priority:
(1) by a person designated in the terms of the trust to act as successor trus-
tee;
(2) by a person appointed by unanimous agreement of the qualified benefi-
ciaries; or
(3) by a person appointed by a court.
(d) A vacancy in a trusteeship of a charitable trust that is required to be filled
must be filled in the following order of priority:
(1) by a person designated in the terms of the trust to act as successor trus-
tee;
(2) by a person selected by the charitable organizations expressly desig-
nated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust if the attorney
genxtral conzuys in th~e stetilaw; 4m
(3) by a person appointed by a court.
(e) Whether or not a vacancy in a trusteeship exists or is required to be filled, a
court may appoint an additional trustee or special fiduciary whenever the court
considers the appointment necessary for the administration of the trust.
ATC § 28-73-704.
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the distinction between qualified and non-qualified beneficiaries. Court ap-
proval is not needed for either of these types of successor trustees. Arkansas
has virtually no law on this point.
D. Resignation of a Trustee-Section 705273
Under the common law, a trustee may resign only with the approval of
the court.274 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts additionally allows resigna-
tion with the consent of all the beneficiaries.275 This section goes one step
further and simply requires the trustee to give notice to the qualified benefi-
ciaries, settlor and any trustees and wait thirty days before resigning. Only
trustees of irrevocable trusts created after Sept. 1, 2005 have the benefit of
this freedom to resign. Again, note that only the "qualified" beneficiaries
must be notified. Arkansas currently has no law on this issue.
273. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee may resign:
(1) upon at least thirty (30) days' notice to the qualified beneficiaries, the
settlor, if living, and all co-trustees; or
(2) with the approval of a court.
(b) In approving a resignation, a court may issue orders and impose conditions
reasonably necessary for the protection of the trust property.
(c) Any liability of a resigning trustee or of any sureties on the trustee's bond for
acts or omissions of the trustee is not discharged or affected by the trustee's res-
ignation.
(d) Subsection (a) of this section applies only to irrevocable trusts created on or
after September 1, 2005, and to revocable trusts which become irrevocable on or
before September 1, 2005.
ATC § 28-73-705.
274. UTC § 705 cmt.
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 36 (2001).
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E. Removal of a Trustee-Section 706276
Subsection (a) alters the common law rule by allowing the settlor of an
irrevocable trust the right to petition for the removal of a trustee.277 While a
trust is revocable, beneficiaries may not petition for removal unless the
settlor loses capacity. The rest of the statute lists the grounds for removal of
a trustee. In addition to the traditional grounds for removal, such as a seri-
ous breach of trust, the statute gives the court the power to remove a trustee
if all of the qualified beneficiaries so request. Three findings must be made:
removal must best serve the interests of all the beneficiaries; removal must
not be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust; and a suitable re-
placement or co-trustee must be available. This provision is analogous to
Section 411, allowing beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust if it is not
278inconsistent with a material purpose.
Under current Arkansas law, the most prevalent reason for the removal
of a trustee is lack of cooperation (usually characterized by the court as
"hostility") among co-trustees. 279 This hostility may be joined with miscon-
duct280 or lack of attention to the trust.281 In only one removal case were no
276. This section reads as follows:
(a) The settlor, a co-trustee, or a beneficiary may request the court to remove a
trustee, or a trustee may be removed by the court on its own initiative.
(b) A court may remove a trustee if:
(1) the trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;
(2) lack of cooperation among co-trustees substantially impairs the admini-
stration of the trust;
(3) because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to
administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the
trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries; or
(4) there has been a substantial change of circumstances or removal is re-
quested by all of the qualified beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of
the trustee best serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not in-
consistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable co-trustee or
successor trustee is available.
(c) Pending a final decision on a request to remove a trustee, or in lieu of or in
addition to removing a trustee, the court may order such appropriate relief under
§ 28-73-1001(b) as may be necessary to protect the trust property or the interests
of the beneficiaries.
ATC § 28-73-706.
277. UTC § 706 cmt.
278. Id.
279. See Thinn v. Parks, 79 Ark. App. 20, 83 S.W.3d 430 (2002) (citing Restatement
(Se~axd) af Trusts § I07(a) (1959) as authority); Hargraves v. Hargraves, 14 Ark. kpp. 230,
234-35, 686 S.W.2d 816, 818 (1985) (en banc); Ashman v. Pickens, 12 Ark. App. 233, 237,
674 S.W.2d 4, 5-6 (1984); Blumenstiel v. Morris, 207 Ark. 244, 250, 180 S.W.107, 109
(1944).
280. Hargraves, 14 Ark. App. at 234-35, 686 S.W.2d 818.
281. Ashman, 12 Ark. App. at 237, 674 S.W.2d at 5-6.
2005]
UALR LAW REVIEW
co-trustees involved.282 Here, the trustee was removed for purchasing un-
productive trust property without any authority, failing to comply with or-
ders of the lower court for a number of years, refusing to account to the
beneficiaries, and intentionally favoring his children as remaindermen over
his former wife as income beneficiary. 283
F. Compensation and Reimbursement of Trustees-Sections 708284 and
709285
If the trust is silent in this regard, the ATC sets a reasonable level of
compensation. Even if the trust does specify a level of compensation, a
court may adjust the level in light of surrounding circumstances. The ATC
does not answer the question of whether trustees who hire their own lawyers
can charge dual fees, but notes that the trend is affirmative as long as the
overall fees are reasonable.286 Trustees can be reimbursed from trust prop-
erty for authorized expenses, and even unauthorized expenses, if they bene-
fited the trust, in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust. Trustees are
not entitled to attorney's fees incurred if the outcome of the action is a find-
ing that the trustee breached the trust.287
282. Riegler v. Riegler, 262 Ark. 70, 553 S.W.2d 37 (1977).
283. Id. at 78, 553 S.W.2d at 40.
284. This section reads as follows:
(a) If the terms of a trust do not specify the trustee's compensation, a trustee is
entitled to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.
(b) If the terms of a trust specify the trustee's compensation, the trustee is enti-
tled to be compensated as specified, but the court may allow more or less com-
pensation if:
(1) the duties of the trustee are substantially different from those contem-
plated when the trust was created; or
(2) the compensation specified by the terms of the trust would be unrea-
sonably low or high.
ATC § 28-73-708.
285. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as
appropriate, for:
(1) expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of the trust;
and
(2) to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust, ex-
penses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the trust.
(b) An advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust gives rise
to a lien against trust property to secure reimbursement with reasonable interest.
ATC § 28-73-709.
286. UTC § 708 cmt.
287. UTC § 709 cmt.
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X. ARTICLE 8-THE DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE
Article 8 states the duties and powers of a trustee. It provides guidance
for those increasingly common situations involving family or self-settled
trusts. It and Article 9 contain verbatim or slightly modified sections of the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which was adopted by Arkansas in 1997.288
Section 813 has engendered some national controversy-the expansion of
the duty of trustees to report regularly to beneficiaries has set the policy
favoring the "dead hand" of the settlor on a collision course against policies
favoring the rights of beneficiaries. The sections in Article 8 are discussed
out of order because duties are grouped together and treated first, followed
by powers.
A. Initial Duties of the Trustee-Sections 801 through 806
These sections lay out typical duties of the trustee: good faith admini-
stration of the trust according to its terms and for the interests of the benefi-
ciaries;289 loyalty; 290 impartiality as between beneficiaries; 291 prudent ad-
ministration; 292 keeping administrative costs reasonable; 293 and using special
skills or expertise in the service of the trust.294 These duties have their
grounding in common law and can be found in the Restatements. They are
not mandatory (except for part of section 813); the settlor is free to modify
them, but not to the extent that all trustee duties disappear.295Arkansas case
law has specifically recognized the duties of good faith adninistration;
296
impartiality; 297 prudent administration; 298 and of course, loyalty.
288. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 23-51-200-23-51-211 (LEXIS 2000).
289. This section reads as follows: "Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall
administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests
of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this chapter." ATC § 28-73-801.
290. For the text of Section 28-73-802 see infra note 300.
291. This section reads as follows: "If a trust has two (2) or more beneficiaries, the trus-
tee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due
regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests." ATC § 28-73-803.
292. This section reads as follows: "A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent per-
son would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other cir-
cumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care,
skill, and caution." ATC § 28-73-804.
293. This section reads as follows: "In administering a trust, the trustee may incur only
costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property, the purposes of the trust, and the
skills of the trustee." ATC § 28-73-805.
294. This settizn rads as fololws" "Ak t rstee w'a has s ;mal skills exte se, vr is
named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has special skills
or expertise, shall use those special skills or expertise." ATC § 28-73-806.
295. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 56 at 1122-23.
296. See, e.g., Riegler, 262 Ark. at 75-76, 553 S.W.2d at 40 (ruling a breach of duty
where a trustee with neither authority nor court permission used trust funds to purchase un-
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The most "fundamental" duty is loyalty, 299 and the most extensive of
these sections is 802.300 Black letter law forbids self-dealing by trustees.
productive land).
297. Id. at 78, 553 S.W.2d at 41 (finding a breach of duty where trustee favored remain-
dermen, his children, over the income beneficiary, his former wife).
298. See, e.g., Gregory v. Moose, 266 Ark. App. 926, 930, 590 S.W.2d 665, 668 (1979)
(ruling no breach of duty where trustee had land appraised and sold it at its fair market value,
and land was offered to beneficiaries, who declined to buy).
299. See generally Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty
Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 Mo. L. REV. 279 (2002) (summarizing the development
of the duty of loyalty and analyzing its treatment by the UTC).
300. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
(b) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as pro-
vided in § 28-73-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the
investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the
trustee's own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict be-
tween the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary
affected by the transaction unless:
(1) the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust;
(2) the transaction was approved by a court;
(3) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time
allowed by § 28-73-1005;
(4) the beneficiary consented to the trustee's conduct, ratified the transac-
tion, or released the trustee in compliance with § 28-73-1009; or
(5) the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the
trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee.
(c) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or man-
agement of trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between per-
sonal and fiduciary interests if it is entered into by the trustee with:
(1) the trustee's spouse;
(2) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses;
(3) an agent or attorney of the trustee; or
(4) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, or a per-
son that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might
affect the trustee's best judgment.
(d) A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern trust
property but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the trustee re-
tains significant influence over the beneficiary and from which the trustee ob-
tains an advantage is voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee establishes
that the transaction was fair to the beneficiary.
(e) A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages in
the trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and fiduci-
ary interests if the transaction concerns an opportunity properly belonging to the
trust.
(f) (1) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or in-
vestment trust to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity
other than as trustee is not presumed to be affected by a conflict between per-
sonal and fiduciary interests if the investment otherwise complies with the pru-
dent investor rule of subchapter 9.
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Trustees must subject their own interests to those of the trust. However, the
Comment points out that often today, the trustee is a beneficiary, or the trus-
tee is a family member who is an officer in a company in which the settlor
owns stock.3 °1 In such instances, the trust should be written to address how
such conflicts should be handled; a settlor can override particular duties in
the terms of the trust.
302
Self-dealing transactions entered into for the trustee's own personal
account are voidable by the beneficiary. The ATC adopts the "no further
inquiry" rule for irrevocable trusts created after Sept. 1, 2005, and does not
require any further proof.30 3 However, transactions involving persons with
close ties to the trustee are held to a looser standard: there is a rebuttable
presumption of voidability. An exception to the "no further inquiry" rule
applies to trustee investments in mutual funds, which allow trustees to gain
additional compensation from the mutual funds in the form of fees for in-
(2) The trustee may be compensated by the investment company or invest-
ment trust for providing those services out of fees charged to the trust.
(3) If the trustee receives compensation from the investment company or
investment trust for providing management services, the trustee shall at
least annually notify the persons entitled under § 28-73-813 to receive a
copy of the trustee's annual report of the rate and method by which the
compensation was determined.
(g) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar in-
terests in other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of the
beneficiaries. If the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of en-
terprise, the trustee shall elect or appoint directors or other managers who will
manage the corporation or enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
(h) This section does not preclude the following transactions, if fair to the bene-
ficiaries:
(1) an agreement between a trustee and a beneficiary relating to the ap-
pointment or compensation of the trustee;
(2) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee;
(3) a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, or
conservatorship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary
has an interest;
(4) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial service institution oper-
ated by the trustee; or
(5) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust.
(i) A court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to
any proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the
trustee.
(j) Subsections (b)-(e) of this section apply only to irrevocable trusts created on
or after September 1, 2005, and to revocable trusts which become irrevocable on
or ailer September 1, 2W5.
ATC § 28-73-802.
301. UTC § 802 cmt.
302. Id.
303. Id. For more discussion of the "no further inquiry" rule, see Boxx, supra note 299,
at 282-91, 298-305.
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vestment advice and other services. 304 "Subsection (f) attempts to retain the
advantages of mutual funds while at the same time making clear that such
investments are subject to traditional fiduciary responsibilities., 30 5 Most
states, including Arkansas, have statutes authorizing trustees to invest in
mutual funds.30 6 Finally, in support of the "corporate opportunity doctrine,"
this section makes voidable transactions by trustees that involve opportuni-
ties rightfully belonging to the trust.30 7
The duty of loyalty is the subject of more Arkansas case law than any
other trustee's duty, but nonetheless, as the reader may have guessed by
now, it is sparse. Only a handful of cases discuss the duty of loyalty in any
detail, and most of them employ stock phrases of black letter law. Hardy v.
Hardy0 8 is one of the most-cited. In this case involving the litigious Hardy
family, the mother was a trustee of her husband's testamentary trust for the
benefit of her three children. She had declined to petition for dower and had
taken her testamentary share of the estate, which was considerable. None-
theless, for several years she had sold timber on trust land and, acting on the
advice of her attorney-accountant, had taken a dower share of the proceeds.
The chancery court had issued orders approving her annual administration
of the trust and share of the proceeds. The Supreme Court held that the
chancery court's orders were interlocutory and not final, and that even
though she acted in good faith, she had breached the trust and would have to
repay it.
30 9
In Riegler v. Riegler, a trustee borrowed trust money to purchase un-
productive, vacant land for his medical practice.310 He failed to reimburse
the trust and later requested additional loans to purchase yet more unproduc-
tive land and to construct a building.311 For these and other reasons he was
304. UTC § 802 cmt.
305. Id.
306. Under pre-ATC Arkansas law, a trustee has a duty to diversify. ARK. CODE ANN. §
23-51-202 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005). A trustee also has the duty of loy-
alty, but "[t]his duty is consistent with and shall not be construed to abrogate the powers
granted to banks and trust companies pursuant to § 28-71-104." Id. § 23-51-204. The section
referred to authorizes trustees to invest in the securities of an investment trust or investment
company, notwithstanding the fact that the trustee is receiving compensation for services to
the investment trust or investment company. id. § 28-71-104.
307. UTC § 802 cmt.
308. 217 Ark. 296, 230 S.W.2d 6 (1950).
309. Id. at 302, 230 S.W.2d at 10. Four years later, the same trust came before the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court again. After sixteen years of administering the trust gratis, the mother
submitted an invoice for trustees' fees for sixteen years. Ultimately the Supreme Court de-
nied her compensation. This was the third suit between the son and his mother over her ad-
ministration of the trust. Hardy v. Hardy, 222 Ark. 932, 263 S.W.2d 690 (1954).
310. Rieglerv. Riegler, 262 Ark. 70, 72-73, 553 S.W.2d 37, 38-39 (1977).
311. Id. at 75, 553 S.W.2d at 39.
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removed as trustee and ordered to reimburse the trust for the cost of the land
plus interest.
312
In Gregory v. Moose, a trustee-beneficiary sold some land to a third
party after unsuccessfully offering it to other beneficiaries. 313The other
beneficiaries later attacked the sale on a number of different grounds.
3 14
The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that even though the trustee-
beneficiary benefited from the sale, he had not breached the duty of loyalty,
because the trustee had broad powers and the terms of the instrument clearly
contemplated this kind of action. The court went on to say that before it
would cancel a sale by a trustee with a power of sale, the price must be so
low as to shock the conscience of the court.
315
This exception to the absolute ban on self-dealing when the trustee is
also a beneficiary was unsuccessfully argued in Hosey v. Burgess.3 1 6 Here,
co-trustees who were also remainder beneficiaries leased land from the
trust, paying an annual rental of approximately $12,000.' 17 They violated
the terms of their lease by terminating their fanning operation and subleas-
ing the land, receiving $88,000 annually for rent.318 They breached the trust
by keeping the difference, instead of paying it to the life income benefici-
ary.319 The chancellor found that the self-dealing was "innocent," but none-
theless required the co-trustees to pay over the rent.320 The co-trustees un-
successfully argued the same exception from Moose.32' Ironically, family
trusts where some relatives are solely beneficiaries and others are trus-
tee/beneficiaries are the very types of trusts where the trustees must act
most carefully to avoid later accusations of self-dealing, and the very type
where they are probably least likely to.
Section 803,322 impartiality, is similar to Section 6 of the Uniform Pru-
dent Investor Act (UPIA),323 except that it has been broadened to include
distribution as well as investment and management by the trustee. Section
804,324 prudent administration, is virtually identical to Section 2(a) of the
312. Id at 77-78, 553 S.W.2dat4l.
313. Gregory v. Moose, 266 Ark. App. 926, 927-28, 590 S.W.2d 665, 667 (1979).
314. Id. at 928, 590 S.W.2d at 667.
315. Id. at 930, 590 S.W.2d at 668. (cited with approval in McCollum v. McCollum, 328
Ark. 607, 610, 946 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1997)).
316. Hosey v. Burgess, 319 Ark. 183, 890 S.W.2d 262 (1995).
317. Id. at 185, 890 S.W.2d at 263.
318. Id. at 188-189, 890 S.W.2d at 264-65.
319. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 266.
320. Id. at 266-267, 890 S.W.2d at 191-92.
321. Id. at 191, 890 S.W.2d at 266.
322. This section reads as follows: "If a trust has two (2) or more beneficiaries, the trus-
tee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due
regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests." ATC § 28-73-803.
323. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-51-205 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
324. This section reads as follows: "A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent per-
2005)
UALR LAW REVIEW
UPIA.32 5 Section 805,326 the duty not to incur unreasonable costs, tracks
Section 7 of the UPIA.3 27 Finally, Section 806,328 the duty to use special
skills, is similar to Section 2(f) of the UPIA.329
son would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other cir-
cumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care,
skill, and caution." ATC § 28-73-804.
325. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-51-201(a) (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
326. This section reads as follows: "In administering a trust, the trustee may incur only
costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property, the purposes of the trust, and the
skills of the trustee." ATC § 28-73-805.
327. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-51-206 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
328. This section reads as follows: "A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is
named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has special skills
329 AR.tise, shaluse thl5se -sp1cia .l 1% 4m (tbrtis reeaeTC § 29-73-P936.
329. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-51-201 (f). (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
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B. Duty to Inform and Report-Section 813330
This section clarifies and expands the trustee's fundamental duty to ac-
count with respect to trusts becoming or created irrevocable after September
1, 2005. The drafters have substituted the phrase "inform and report" to
denote the idea that the information furnished need not be in any particular
330. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably in-
formed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary
for them to protect their interests. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances,
a trustee shall promptly respond to a beneficiary's request for information re-
lated to the administration of the trust.
(b) A trustee:
(1) shall promptly furnish to the beneficiary a copy of the trust instrument
upon request of a beneficiary;
(2) within sixty (60) days after accepting a trusteeship, shall notify the
qualified beneficiaries of the acceptance and of the trustee's name, address,
and telephone number; and
(3) Within sixty (60) days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of
the creation of an irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowl-
edge that a formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable, whether by the
death of the settlor or otherwise, shall notify the qualified beneficiaries:
(A) of the trust's existence;
(B) of the identity of the settlor or settlers;
(C) of the right to request a copy of the trust instrument; and
(D) of the right to a trustee's report as provided in subsection (c) of
this section; and
(E) in advance of any change in the method or rate of the trustee's
compensation.
(c) (1) A trustee shall send to the distributees or permissible distributees of trust
income or principal, and to other qualified or nonqualified beneficiaries who re-
quest it, at least annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of the trust
property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and
amount of the trustee's compensation, a listing of the trust assets and, if feasible,
their respective market values.
(2) Upon a vacancy in a trusteeship, unless a co-trustee remains in office, a
report must be sent to the qualified beneficiaries by the former trustee.
(3) A personal representative, conservator, or guardian may send the quali-
fied beneficiaries a report on behalf of a deceased or incapacitated trustee.
(d) A beneficiary may waive the right to a trustee's report or other information
otherwise required to be furnished under this section. A beneficiary, with respect
to future reports and other information, may withdraw a waiver previously
given.
(e) Subsections (a)-(c) of this section apply only to an irrevocable trust created
on or after September 1, 2005, and to a revocable trust which becomes irrevoca-
ble on or after September 1, 2005.
ATC § 28-73-813.
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format-the key is whether it provides beneficiaries with the information
necessary to protect their interests.331 What comprises the duty to report?
First, under the ATC, when a revocable trust becomes irrevocable,
trustees must inform certain people of its existence. For many trusts, this
event would occur at the death or incapacity of the settlor. Under the UTC,
notification in, the event of incapacity can be waived, but nat in the event of
death.332 The Arkansas amendments, however, allow settlers to waive all
such notice requirements.
333
EXAMPLE: S creates a revocable trust that contains no provisions as to
notice. S is the only current income beneficiary. At S's death, income is
to be paid out to A and B, and after their deaths the remainder to C. S be-
comes incompetent. Under Section 603 the trustee must inform A and B
(C is not a qualified beneficiary while S is alive) of the trust's existence
and their rights to request information.
EXAMPLE: Assume the same parties as above, and the same disposi-
tion, but this time S's trust states that beneficiaries are not to be notified
until her death (waiving Section 603), and waives all of Section 813. S
becomes incompetent. The trustee may not notify anyone about the trust.
Now S dies. Under the UTC, the trustee must notify A and B, who are
now current distributees, of the trust's existence and their rights to re-
quest information, but may not notify C, who is neither a current nor
permissible distributee at this point. However, under the ATC, as Arkan-
sas has amended it, the trustee has no statutory duty to provide any type
of notice to A, B or C.
A trustee has a duty-but one that can be waived-to furnish a benefi-
ciary a copy of the trust instrument upon request.
All other duties of section 813 can be waived by the terms of the trust.
These duties include provision of advance notice of any change in the rate
of the trustee's compensation, an annual report containing information de-
tailed in the statute, and a report if a vacancy in a sole trusteeship occurs.
Beneficiaries may waive their right to reports.
Section 813 has generated some controversy nationally. Some settlors
have a strong desire for as much secrecy about trust terms as possible. Pro-
ponents of these trusts argue that existing law gives great power to settlors
over the disposition of their property and section 813 is too limiting.334 In
331. UTC § 813 cmt.
332. UTC § 603 cmt.
333. ATC § 28-73-105.
334. See Donald Kozusko, In Defense of Quiet Trusts, TR. & EST. at 20 (Mar. 2004)
(suggesting alternatives such as the District of Columbia's alternative, where settlors can
name a representative to receive UTC disclosures on behalf of a beneficiary). Cf Robert
Whitman, Full Disclosure is Best, TR. & EST. at 59 (July 2004).
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July of 2004, NCCUSL bracketed section 105(b)(8) and (9), as a sign that
uniformity is not expected with regard to those subsections and that states
have a choice as to whether to enact them. 335 In addition, NCCUSL made
the notice requirements discussed above prospective only "in recognition of
the difficulties in implementing notice provision to pre-UTC trusts.
' 336
335. Of the ten jurisdictions that have enacted the UTC, the District of Columbia, Maine,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New Mexico keep the UTC wording for sections 105 and
813. Kansas, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming, like Arkansas, omit section 813 from the list
of mandatory sections in section 105, thus allowing settlors to waive all of section 813. The
District of Columbia amends section 105, allowing total waiver of section 813. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-1301.05 (LEXIS Supp. 2004). Missouri's approach is almost identical to that of
the ATC: mandatory notice only extends to permissible distributees over the age of twenty-
one. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 92d Gen. As-
sembly (2004)).
336. Legislative Update, supra note 158, at 2.
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C. Discretionary Powers and Tax Savings-Section 814337
Subsection (a) provides a statutory limit to "absolute discretion" on the
part of the trustee. The remaining subsections are federal estate and gift tax
curative provisions, which attempt to alleviate adverse consequences that
arise with some frequency because of drafting errors.
338
337. This section reads as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the terms of
the trust, including the use of such terms as "absolute," "sole," or "uncon-
trolled," the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in ac-
cordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the benefi-
ciaries.
(b) Subject to subsection (d) of this section, and unless the terms of the trust ex-
pressly indicate that a rule in this subsection does not apply:
(1) a person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a trust
that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distributions to or
for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power only in accor-
dance with an ascertainable standard; and
(2) a trustee may not exercise a power to make discretionary distributions
to satisfy a legal obligation of support that the trustee personally owes an-
other person.
(c) A power whose exercise is limited or prohibited by subsection (b) of this sec-
tion may be exercised by a majority of the remaining trustees whose exercise of
the power is not so limited or prohibited. If the power of all trustees is so limited
or prohibited, a court may appoint a special fiduciary with authority to exercise
the power.
(d) Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to:
(1) a power held by the settlor's spouse who is the trustee of a trust for
which a marital deduction, as defined in Section 2056(b)(5) or Section
2523(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on January 1,
2005, was previously allowed;
(2) any trust during any period that the trust may be revoked or amended by
its settlor; or
(3) a trust if contributions to the trust qualify for the annual exclusion under
Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2005.
ATC § 28-73-814.
338. UTC § 814 cmt.
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D. Delegation of Powers-Section 807131
One significant change that the UPIA made to the common law was to
allow trustees to delegate duties and powers. The common law did not allow
delegation of administrative and investment duties, 340 thus severely curtail-
ing investment possibilities in today's financial environment. The ATC ba-
sically adopts section 9 of the UPIA .34 Trustees may delegate to agents.
They must exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in selecting the agent,
establishing the delegation, and monitoring the agent. The agents also owe a
duty to the trust to carry out the delegation. A trustee who has complied
with this section is not liable for an action of the agent. The drafters point
out that this section only concerns delegation to agents, not to co-trustees,
which is covered in section 703.
339. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee may delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of compara-
ble skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall ex-
ercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
(1) selecting an agent;
(2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the
purposes and terms of the trust; and
(3) periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the
agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exer-
cise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
(c) A trustee who complies with subsection (a) of this subsection is not liable to
the beneficiaries or to the trust for an action of the agent to whom the function
was delegated.
(d) By accepting a delegation of powers or duties from the trustee of a trust that
is subject to the law of this state, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of a court
of this state.
ATC § 28-73-807.
340. Walters-Southland Institute v. Walker, 222 Ark. 857, 263 S.W.2d 83 (1954) (citing
the rule but allowing a trustee to delegate bookkeeping).
341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-51-208 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
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E. Power to Direct-Section 808342
This section allows settlors of revocable trusts to direct trustees to take
actions contrary to the terms of the trust, or to confer powers of direction on
persons other than the settlor or trustee. In the former case, the trustee may
follow the direction of the settlor. In the latter, the trustee must act in accor-
dance with the direction unless the exercise is significantly contrary to the
terms of the trust or unless the action would constitute a breach of trust. A
trust may allow someone other than a trustee to modify or terminate a trust.
A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presump-
tively a fiduciary and must act in good faith with regard to the purposes of
the trust.
This section allows the use of trust protectors and advisers. "Advisers"
may assist trustees in directing investments or managing a business of the
trust.34 3 "Protectors" are associated with offshore asset protection trusts.
34 4
This section does not address the power to veto, but the Comment makes
clear that a power to direct is different than a power to veto. A trustee must
receive approval from the person with the power to veto. Such a person is
more like a co-trustee and therefore if the person uses the veto improperly,
the trustee may have to take action if the veto will result in a serious breach
of trust.
345
342. This section reads as follows:
(a) While a trust is revocable, the trustee may follow a direction of the settlor
that is contrary to the terms of the trust.
(b) If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the seullor of a re'vma-
ble trust power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in ac-
cordance with an exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise is mani-
festly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exer-
cise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding
the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.
(c) The terms of a trust may confer upon a trustee or other person a power to di-
rect the modification or termination of the trust.
(d) A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presump-
tively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power
to direct is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty.
ATC § 28-73-808.
343. UTC § 808 cmt.
344. A trust protector acts to protect the trust from "threats." Protectors must consent to
certain acts of the trustee and may havepowers to remove and appoint trustees, change bene-
ficiaries, and perform similar acts. Lischer, supra note 240, at 506-07.
345. UTC § 808 cmt.
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F. General and Specific Powers of Trustees-Sections 815346 and 816 
47
346. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee, without authorization by a court, may exercise:
(1) powers conferred by the terms of the trust; and
(2) except as limited by the terms of the trust:
(A) all powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent
owner has over individually owned property;
(B) any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper investment,
management, and distribution of the trust property; and
(C) any other powers conferred by this chapter.
(b) The exercise of a power is subject to the fiduciary duties prescribed by this
subchapter.
ATC § 28-73-815.
347. This section is extremely long. An abridged version follows:
Without limiting the authority conferred by § 28-73-815, a trustee may:
(1) collect trust property... ;
(2) acquire or sell property, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale;
(3) exchange, partition, or otherwise change the character of trust property;
(4) deposit trust money in an account in a regulated financial service insti-
tution;
(5) borrow money, with or without security, and mortgage or pledge trust
property for a period within or extending beyond the duration of the trust;
(6) with respect to an interest in a proprietorship, partnership, limited liabil-
ity company, business trust, corporation, or other form of business or enter-
prise, continue the business or other enterprise... ;
(7) with respect to stocks or other securities, exercise the rights of an abso-
lute owner, including the right to:
(A) vote, or give proxies to vote...
(B) hold a security in the name of a nominee...;
(C) pay calls, assessments, and other sums chargeable or accruing
against the securities, and sell or exercise stock subscription or conver-
sion rights; and
(D) deposit the securities with a depositary or other regulated financial
service institution;
(8) with respect to an interest in real property, construct, or make ordinary
or extraordinary repairs to, alterations to, or improvements in, buildings or
other structures... ;
(9) enter into a lease for any purpose as lessor or lessee. .
(10) grant an option involving a sale, lease, or other disposition of trust
property or acquire an option for the acquisition of property...
(11) insure the property of the trust against damage or loss...,
(12) abandon or decline to administer property of no value...,
(13) with respect to possible liability for violation of environmental law:
(A) inspect or investigate property the trustee holds or has been asked
to hold... ;
(B) take action to prevent, abate, or otherwise remedy any actual or
potential violation of any environmental law affecting property held
directly or indirectly by the trustee... ;
20051 259
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The ATC includes extensive powers of trustees, eliminating the need
for most drafters to incorporate powers by reference. Section 815 confers
broad general powers on trustees. Powers are subject to fiduciary duties, and
may be exercised without authorization of the court.
Specific powers are set out in section 816. Arkansas already has a fi-
duciary powers statute, which applies to all fiduciaries, including personal
(C) decline to accept property into trust or disclaim any power with re-
spect to property that is or may be burdened with liability for violation
of environmental law;
(D) compromise claims against the trust which may be asserted for an
alleged violation of environmental law; and
(E) pay the expense of any inspection, review, abatement, or remedial
action to comply with environmental law;
(14) pay or contest any claim, settle a claim by or against the trust, and re-
lease, in whole or in part, a claim belonging to the trust;
(15) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee and of employees
and agents of the trust, and other expenses incurred in the administration of
the trust;
(16) exercise elections with respect to federal, state, and local taxes;
(17) select a mode of payment under any employee benefit or retirement
plan, annuity, or life insurance payable to the trustee...
(18) make loans out of trust property... ;
(19) pledge trust property to guarantee loans made by others to the benefi-
ciary;
(20) appoint a trustee to act in another jurisdiction with respect to trust
property located in the other jurisdiction ... ;
(21) pay an amount distributable to a beneficiary who is under a legal dis-
ability... or by:
(A) paying it to the beneficiary's conservator or, if the beneficiary
does not have a conservator, the beneficiary's guardian;
(B) paying it to the beneficiary's custodian... ;
(C) if the trustee does not know of a conservator, guardian, custodian,
or custodial trustee, paying it to an adult relative... to be expended on
the beneficiary's behalf; or
(D) managing it as a separate fund on the beneficiary's behalf...
(22) on distribution of trust property or the division or termination of a
trust, make distributions in divided or undivided interests, allocate particu-
lar assets in proportionate or disproportionate shares, value the trust prop-
erty for those purposes, and adjust for resulting differences in valuation;
(23) resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the trust or its ad-
ministration by mediation, arbitration, or other procedure for alternative
dispute resolution;
(24) prosecute or defend an action, claim, or judicial proceeding in any ju-
risdiction to protect trust property and the trustee in the performance of the
trustee's duties;
(25) sign and deliver contracts and other instruments ... ; and
(26) on termination of the trust, exercise the powers appropriate to wind up
the administration of the trust and distribute the trust property to the per-
sons entitled to it.
ATC § 28-73-816.
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representatives and trustees.348 However, it is an older list and must be in-
corporated by reference to apply. Are there conflicts between the two sets of
powers? The answer is no, because each is a list of affirmative actions. They
overlap to a large extent. Trust drafters who wish trustees to possess the
maximum allowable extent of powers should be careful not to waive sec-
tions 815 and 816, and to incorporate the current Arkansas fiduciary pow-
ers. Trust drafters who wish to omit certain powers should not only fail to
incorporate them by reference, but also specifically waive them by reference
to section 816. Drafters of trusts where the trustee or co-trustee is a layper-
son may wish to expressly list the powers in the instrument, to lessen the
ignorance or confusion of such a trustee.
G. Distribution Upon Termination-Section 817141
This section permits the trustee to carry out a distribution plan if she
gives the beneficiaries notice of the plan and of their right to object and they
do not timely raise any objections. It calls for "expeditious" distribution yet
at the same time authorizes the trustee to retain a reserve for the payment of
debts, expenses and taxes. This section also limits the validity of releases
from liability obtained at the time of termination, applying the general re-
lease principles of section 1009.
XI. ARTICLE 9-THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
Articles 8 and 9 of the ATC include the full text of the Uniform Pru-
dent Investor Act (UPIA).35° The "integrated" UPIA has been enacted as a
348. ARK. CODE AN. § 28-69-304. (LEXIS 2004).
349. This section reads as follows:
(a) Upon termination or partial termination of a trust, the trustee may send to the
beneficiaries a proposal for distribution. The right of any beneficiary to object to
the proposed distribution terminates if the beneficiary does not notify the trustee
of an objection within thirty (30) days after the proposal was sent but only if the
proposal informed the beneficiary of the right to object and of the time allowed
for objection.
(b) Upon the occurrence of an event terminating or partially terminating a trust,
the trustee shall proceed expeditiously to distribute the trust property to the per-
sons entitled to it, subject to the right of the trustee to retain a reasonable reserve
for the payment of debts, expenses, and taxes.
(c) A release by a beneficiary of a trustee from liability for breach of trust is in-
valid to the extent:
(1) it was induced by improper conduct of the trustee; or
(2) the beneficiary, at the time of the release, did not know of the benefici-
ary's rights or of the material facts relating to the breach.
ATC § 28-73-817.
350. ARK. CODE AN. §§ 23-51-200-23-51-211 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1,
20051
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part of the ATC and the "old" UPIA in Title 23 has been repealed; thus the
UPIA has moved from Title 23 to Title 28, which is more appropriate, since
Title 28 deals with wills, estates, trusts and fiduciary relationships. Since
some readers may not be familiar with the UPIA, the most important sec-
tions are included here. No Arkansas appellate decisions have interpreted
the UPIA.
A. The Prudent Investor Rule-Section 901351
This section replaces previous standards for prudence with the "pru-
dent investor" rule. Attributes of the prudent investor are set out in the fol-
lowing sections. The section makes clear that the prudent investor rule is a
default rule. Settlors are free to alter it in any lawful way.
2005).
351. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a trustee who
invests and manages trust assets owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to
comply with the prudent investor rule set forth in this subchapter.
(b) The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted, elimi-
nated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust. A trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable reliance on the pro-
visions of the trust.
ATC § 28-73-901.
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B. Standard of Care-Portfolio Strategy-Risk and Return Objectives-
Section 902352
This is the most important section in the UPIA. Subsection (a) defines
the prudent investor rule, an objective standard. Subsection (b) sets the
"trust portfolio" as the context in which a trustee's investment and man-
agement decisions will be evaluated. The UPIA was written in response to
"modern portfolio theory," a now-accepted view of the market that has
proved that over time, the greater diversity in an investor's portfolio, the
greater return she will receive.353 This section also requires "risk and return"
objectives suitable to the trust. Subsection (c) lists factors that may bear on
risk and return decisions by trustee investors. Trustees are freed to invest in
any type of property.
352. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circum-
stances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reason-
able care, skill, and caution.
(b) A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual as-
sets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as
a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return ob-
jectives reasonably suited to the trust.
(c) Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing and managing
trust assets are such of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiar-
ies:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall
trust portfolio, which may include financial assets, interests in closely held
enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property;
(5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or apprecia-
tion of capital; and
(8) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of
the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.
(d) A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the invest-
ment and management of trust assets.
(e) A trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent
with the standards of this subchapter.
ATC § 28-73-902.
353. For a brief history of standards for investment prudence and a discussion of the
UPIA, see generally John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of
Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REv. 641 (1996).
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C. Duties of Trustees-Sections 903'14 through 907
Section 903 imposes an essential duty following modem portfolio the-
ory: the duty to diversify investments. It may be overridden by the purposes
of the specific trust. Section 904315 requires trustees new to a trust to review
the trust assets and make whatever changes are necessary to bring the trust
into compliance with its terms and with the UPIA. Section 905356 clarifies
the standard to be used in determining whether a trustee has complied with
the prudent investor rule. Section 906357 sets out synonyms for "prudent
investment."
Trustees must fairly balance different and competing interest of bene-
ficiaries, not only of beneficiaries with simultaneous interests but also those
with successive interests. More on impartiality with respect to trust man-
agement can be found in the Uniform Principal and Income Act.358 Section
907359 imposes a duty on trustees not to waste trust property but to minimize
investment costs.
354. This section reads as follows: "A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust
unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes
of the trust are better served without diversifying." ATC § 28-73-903.
355. This section reads as follows:
Within a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving trust assets, a
trustee shall review the trust assets and make and implement decisions concern-
ing the retention and disposition of assets, in order to bring the trust portfolio
into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust, and with the requirements of this subchapter.
ATC § 28-73-904.
356. This section reads as follows: "Compliance with the prudent investotr rule is deter-
mined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's decision or
action and not by hindsight." ATC § 28-73-905.
357. This section reads as follows:
The following terms or comparable language in the provisions of a trust, unless
otherwise limited or modified, authorizes any investment or strategy permitted
under this subchapter: "investments permissible by law for investment of trust
funds," "legal investments," "authorized investments,". "using the judgment and
care under the circumstances then prevailing that persons of prudence, discre-
tion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in re-
gard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital,"
"prudent man rule," "prudent trustee rule," "prudent person rule," and "prudent
investor rule."
ATC § 28-73-906.
358. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-70-101--605 (LEXIS 2004).
359. This section reads as follows: "In investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may
only incur costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of
the trust, and the skills of the trustee." ATC § 28-73-907.
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XII. ARTICLE 10
Article 10 concerns the liability of trustees and the rights of third per-
sons-persons other than trustees and beneficiaries. The drafters note that
much of this article cannot be overridden by the terms of the trust, in par-
ticular the rights of third persons, and the court's ability to remedy a breach
of trust.36°
A. Breach of Trust-Definition and Remedies-Section 1001361
The ATC defines a breach of trust simply as "[a] violation by a trustee
of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary." This definition is identical to
that used by the Arkansas Supreme Court.362 The section makes a wide va-
riety of remedies available for breach, giving Arkansas law a statutory list.
As well, this section codifies the parties who have standing to sue for
breach.
360. UTC art. 10 general cmt.
361. This section reads as follows:
(a) a violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary is a breach
of trust.
(b) to remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or may occur, the court may:
(1) compel the trustee to perform the trustee's duties;
(2) enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(3) compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money, restor-
ing property, or other means;
(4) order a trustee to account;
(5) appoint a special fiduciary to take possession of the trust property and
administer the trust;
(6) suspend the trustee;
(7) remove the trustee as provided in § 28-73-706;
(8) reduce or deny compensation to the trustee;
(9) subject to § 28-73-1012, void an act of the trustee, impose a lien or a
constructive trust on trust property, or trace trust property wrongfully dis-
posed of and recover the property or its proceeds; or
(10) order any other appropriate relief.
ATC § 28-73-1001.
362. Breach of trust is defined as a "violation by the trustee of any duty which as trustee
he owes to the beneficiary." Dunklin v. Ramsay, 328 Ark. 263, 275, 944 S.W.2d 76, 82
(1997) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 (1959)).
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B. Measure of Damages-Sections 1002363 and 1003364
This section sets out two possibilities for the measure of damages.
Note that trustees are entitled to contribution from co-trustees unless the
trustee was substantially more at fault, acted in bad faith, or acted in reck-
less indifference. Trustees are also liable for any profit from the trust (not
including routine compensation), even if they have not committed any
breach. However, should a trust depreciate or fail to make a profit, a trustee
is not liable-in the words of the Comment, "[t]he trustee is not an insurer."
C. Attorney's Fees and Costs-Section 1004365
This section allows reasonable attorney's fees to be paid, either by a
party or by the trust, as the court considers to be fair.
363. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable to the beneficiaries affected
for the greater of:
(1) the amount required to restore the value of the trust property and trust
distributions to what they would have been had the breach not occurred; or
(2) the profit the trustee made by reason of the breach.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if more than one trustee is
liable to the beneficiaries for a breach of trust, a trustee is entitled to contribution
from the other trustee or trustees. A trustee is not entitled to contribution if the
trustee was substantially more at fault than another trustee or if the trustee com-
mitted the breach of trust in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the pur-
poses of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries. A trustee who received a
benefit from the breach of trust is not entitled to contribution from another trus-
tee to the extent of the benefit received.
ATC § 28-73-1002.
364. This section reads as follows:
(a) A trustee is accountable to an affected beneficiary for any profit made by the
trustee arising from the administration of the trust, even absent a breach of trust.
(b) Absent a breach of trust, a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for a loss or
depreciation in the value of trust property or for not having made a profit."
ATC § 28-73-1003.
365. This section reads as follows: "In a judicial proceeding involving the administration
of a trust, a court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, includ-
ing reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that
is the subject of the controversy." ATC § 28-73-1004.
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D. Statute of Limitations Against Trustee-Section 1005366
If the beneficiary suing the trustee for breach receives a report from the
trustee that adequately discloses the existence of a potential claim for breach
and informs the beneficiary of the one-year time limit for commencing an
action, the beneficiary has one year within the receipt of the report to file.
However, the report must either disclose the existence of a potential claim
for breach, or provide sufficient information so that the beneficiary should
have inquired. If there is no report, the ATC gives beneficiaries a five-year
period in which to sue-five years after the first to occur of the removal,
resignation, or death of trustee; five years after the termination of the bene-
ficiary's interest in the trust; or five years after the termination of the trust.
This section is new law for Arkansas, which currently has no specific statute
of limitations for suing a trustee unless the suit falls under the Uniform Cus-
todial Trust Act.367 Thus, trust lawsuits would fall under the five year statute
of limitations.368 However there is precedent to the effect that a statute of
limitations does not run between a trustee and a beneficiary as long as the
trust exists, unless the trustee repudiates the trust and this becomes known
to the beneficiary.369 In keeping with equity's jurisdiction over trusts, laches
has been a common, if unsuccessful, defense in trust lawsuits.
370
366. This section reads as follows:
(a) A beneficiary may not commence a proceeding against a trustee for breach of
trust more than one (1) year after the date the beneficiary or a representative of
the beneficiary was sent a report that adequately disclosed the existence of a po-
tential claim for breach of trust and informed the beneficiary of the time allowed
for commencing a proceeding.
(b) A report adequately discloses the existence of a potential claim for breach of
trust if it provides sufficient information so that the beneficiary or representative
knows of the potential claim or should have inquired into its existence.
(c) If subsection (a) of this section does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a
beneficiary against a trustee for breach of tnist must be commenced within five
(5) years after the first to occur of:
(1) the removal, resignation, or death of the trustee;
(2) the termination of the beneficiary's interest in the trust; or
(3) the termination of the trust.
ATC § 28-73-1005.
367. This statute sets out several different time periods depending on whether the suit is
for accounting, breach, or fraud, but in general gives a shorter time period (two or three years
for some types of actions) than does the ATC. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-72-416 (LEXIS 2004).
368. Actions not provided for under a more specific statute must be filed within five
years after the cause of action accrues. Id. § 16-56-115.
369. McPherson v. McPherson, 258 Ark. 257, 264, 523 S.W.2d 623, 627-28 (1975).
370. Only if the beneficiary delays too long after receiving knowledge of the breach will
laches apply. Id., 523 S.W.2d at 627-28.
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E. Insulation of Good Faith Trustees-Sections 1006371 and 1007372
A trustee who reasonably relies on unclear trust terms is not liable to a
beneficiary for breach to the extent that the breach resulted from the reli-
ance. Similarly, a trustee who exercises reasonable care to ascertain the
happening of an event such as marriage, divorce or graduation is not liable
from a loss due to her lack of knowledge.
F. Exculpatory Clauses for Trustees-Section 1008373
This section clarifies an area where no Arkansas law exists. An excul-
patory clause in a trust is unenforceable against acts committed by the trus-
tee in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the trust purposes or benefi-
ciaries' interests. An exculpatory clause is also unenforceable if it was in-
serted as a result of an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship by
the trustee. Finally, such a clause drafted or caused to be drafted by the trus-
tee is invalid unless the trustee can prove both that the term is fair and that
its existence and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor. A
clear and convincing level of proof is not required. If the settlor is repre-
sented by independent counsel, the clause is valid. Note that this section is
not retroactive towards irrevocable trusts. It is mandatory in the UTC, but
Arkansas allows it to be waived by the terms of a trust.
371. This section reads as follows: "A trustee who acts in reasonable reliance on the
terms of the trust as expressed in the trust instrument is not liable to a beneficiary for a
breach of trust to the extent the breach resulted from the reliance." ATC § 28-73-1006.
372. This section reads as follows: "If the happening of an event, including marriage,
divorce, performance of educational requirements, or death, affects the administration or
distribution of a trust, a trustee who has exercised reasonable care to ascertain the happening
of the event is not liable for a loss resulting from the trustee's lack of knowledge." ATC §
28-73-1007.
373. This section reads as follows:
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unen-
forceable to the extent that it:
(1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith
or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of
the beneficiaries; or
(2) was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship to the settlor.
(b) An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid
as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves
that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence
and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor.
(c) This section applies only to irrevocable trusts created on or after September
1, 2005, and to revocable trusts which became, irrevocable on or after September
1,2005.
ATC § 28-73-1008.
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G. Limitations on Liability-Sections 1009 through 1011
Section 1009374 releases a trustee from liability if a beneficiary con-
sented to the wrongful conduct, released the trustee from liability, or ratified
the transaction. Two exceptions apply: if the action by the beneficiary was
induced by improper conduct of the trustee, or if the beneficiary acted not
knowing of her rights or of the material facts.
Section 1010375 relieves the trustee of liability from personal liability
on a contract entered into as a trustee if the capacity of trustee is disclosed
in the contract. It relieves a trustee of liability for torts committed while
administering a trust, or for obligations arising from property interests, in-
cluding violations of environmental law, unless the trustee is personally at
fault. Finally, altering the common law rule,376 the statute allows claims
against the trustees arising in these areas to be asserted in a judicial proceed-
ing against a trustee (for example, in a proceeding to remove a trustee) even
if a trustee is not personally liable.
What about a trustee who is a general partner in a general or limited
partnership that breaches a contract or commits a tort while administering a
trust? Section 1011377 extends the protection from personal liability to such
374. This section reads as follows:
A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of trust if the beneficiary con-
sented to the conduct constituting the breach, released the trustee from liability
for the breach, or ratified the transaction constituting the breach, unless:
(1) the consent, release, or ratification of the beneficiary was induced by im-
proper conduct of the trustee; or
(2) at the time of the consent, release, or ratification, the beneficiary did not
know of the beneficiary's rights or of the material facts relating to the breach.
ATC § 28-73-1009.
375. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally liable
on a contract properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity in the
course of administering the trust if the trustee in the contract disclosed the fidu-
ciary capacity.
(b) A trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the course of administer-
ing a trust, or for obligations arising from ownership or control of trust property,
including liability for violation of environmental law, only if the trustee is per-
sonally at fault.
(c) A claim based on a contract entered into by a trustee in the trustee's fiduciary
capacity, on an obligation arising from ownership or control of trust property, or
on a tort committed in the course of administering a trust, may be asserted in a
judicial proceeding against the trustee in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, whether
or not the trustee is personally liable for the claim.
ATC § 23-73-1010.
376. UTC§1010cmt.
377. This section reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section or unless per-
sonal liability is imposed in the contract, a trustee who holds an interest as a
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a trustee. In case of breach of contract, the partnership's fiduciary capacity
must be disclosed to the other parties to the contract for the protection to
apply. In case of commission of a tort, the limitation is not valid if the trus-
tee is personally at fault. Another subsection prevents forming such partner-
ships to shield assets from creditor claims. Finally, if the trust is revocable
and the trustee holds an interest as a general partner, the settlor is personally
liable for contracts and other obligations, so that a revocable trust cannot be
used as a device for avoiding claims against the partnership. Limited partner
interests, membership interests in an LLC and similar types of interests al-
ready shield the trustee from liability and thus are not included in this sec-
tion."'
general partner in a general or limited partnership is not personally liable on a
contract entered into by the partnership after the trust's acquisition of the interest
if the fiduciary capacity was disclosed in the contract or in a statement previ-
ously filed pursuant to §§ 4-46-101-4-46-1207 or §§ 4-43-101-4-43-1206.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a trustee who
holds an interest as a general partner is not personally liable for torts committed
by the partnership or for obligations arising from ownership or control of the in-
terest unless the trustee is personally at fault.
(c) The immunity provided by this section does not apply if an interest in the
partnership is held by the trustee in a capacity other than that of trustee or is held
by the trustee's spouse or one or more of the trustee's descendants, siblings, or
parents, or the spouse of any of them.
(d) If the trustee of a revocable trust holds an interest as a general partner, the
settlor is personally liable for contracts and other obligations of the partnership
as if the settlor were a general partner.
ATC § 28-73-1011.
378. UTC § 1011 cmt.
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H. Persons Dealing with Trustee-Section 1012...
This section affords protection from liability to different types of third
parties. It protects persons who in good faith assist a trustee, or who in good
faith and for value deal with a trustee, without knowledge that the trustee is
acting improperly. "Knowledge" is defined in section 104 with a definition
based on that of the Uniform Commercial Code.380 This protection is also
extended to those assisting or dealing with former trustees, without knowl-
edge that the trusteeship has terminated. The section makes clear that per-
sons are not required to inquire into the extent of the trustee's powers, or the
propriety of the trustee's exercise of those powers. The section also clarifies
that other statutes relating to commercial transactions could apply in this
situation as well as the ATC, such as the Uniform Commercial Code. Rights
under sections 1010 through 1013 cannot be waived by the terms of a trust;
they are mandatory.38'
379. This section reads as follows:
(a) A person other than a beneficiary who in good faith assists a trustee, or who
in good faith and for value deals with a trustee, without knowledge that the trus-
tee is exceeding or improperly exercising the trustee's powers is protected from
liability as if the trustee properly exercised the power.
(b) A person other than a beneficiary who in good faith deals with a trustee is
not required to inquire into the extent of the trustee's powers or the propriety of
their exercise.
(c) A person who in good faith delivers assets to a trustee need not ensure their
proper application.
(d) A person other than a beneficiary who in good faith assists a former trustee,
or who in good faith and for value deals with a former trustee without knowl-
edge that the trusteeship has terminated is protected from liability as if the for-
mer trustee were still a trustee.
(e) Comparable protective provisions of other laws relating to commercial trans-
actions or transfer of securities by fiduciaries prevail over the protection pro-
vided by this section.
ATC § 28-73-1012.
380. UTC § 104 cmt.
381. ATC § 28-73-105(11).
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I. Certification of Trust-Section 1013382
Often trustees must prove their authority to various persons or entities.
This useful section allows trustees to disclose whatever information is nec-
essary for that purpose while preserving the privacy of the trust. Testamen-
tary trusts are matters of public record, as are the wills that create them.
Inter vivos trusts, on the other hand, are private, and "[s]uch privacy is
compromised . . . if the trust instrument must be distributed to third per-
382. This section reads as follows:
(a) Instead of furnishing a copy of the trust instrument to a person other than a
beneficiary, the trustee may furnish to the person a certification of trust contain-
ing the following information:
(1) a statement that the trust exists and the date the trust instrument was
executed;
(2) the identity of the settlor;
(3) the identity and address of the currently acting trustee;
(4) the powers of the trustee;
(5) the revocability or irrevocability of the trust and the identity of any per-
son holding a power to revoke the trust;
(6) the authority of co-trustees to sign or otherwise authenticate and
whether all or less than all are required in order to exercise powers of the
trustee; and
(7) the manner of taking title to trust property.
(b) A certification of trust may be signed or otherwise authenticated by any trus-
tee.
(c) A certification of trust must state that the trust has not been revoked, modi-
fied, or amended in any manner that would cause the representations contained
in the certification of trust to be incorrect.
(d) A certification of trust need not contain the dispositive terms of a trust.
(e) A recipient of a certification of trust may require the trustee to furnish copies
of those excerpts from the original trust instrument and later amendments which
designate the trustee and confer upon the trustee the power to act in the pending
transaction.
(0 (1) A person who acts in reliance upon a certification of trust without knowl-
edge that the representations contained therein are incorrect is not liable to any
person for so acting and may assume without inquiry the existence of the facts
contained in the certification.
(2) Knowledge of the terms of the trust may not be inferred solely from the
fact that a copy of all or part of the trust instrument is held by the person re-
lying upon the certification.
(g) A person who in good faith enters into a transaction in reliance upon a certi-
fication of trust may enforce the transaction against the trust property as if the
representations contained in the certification were correct.
(b) A person making a demand for the trust instrument in addition to a certifica-
tion of trust or excerpts is liable for damages if a court determines that the per-
son did not act in good faith in demanding the trust instrument.
(i) This section does not limit the right of a person to obtain a copy of the trust
instrument in a judicial proceeding concerning the trust.
ATC § 28-73-813.
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sons.' '383 The statute requires the certification to contain certain information
about the trust, not including any dispositive provisions, although normally
it will contain the relevant administrative provisions of the trust.. The ATC
renders the certification conclusive evidence of the trust.
The rest of the section deals with third parties, protecting persons who
in gpod faith Tely on the certification in making a transaction. Subsection (h)
should be noted: it subjects persons who demand a copy of the trust instru-
ment in addition to the certification to liability for damages if a court deter-
mines that the person did not act in good faith in demanding the trust in-
strument. Thus the drafters hope to encourage compliance with this section.
However, this section does not limit the right of a person to obtain a copy of
the trust instrument in a judicial proceeding concerning the trust. Also,
readers should recall that beneficiaries are free to request a copy of the trust
instrument.
384
The federal Patriot Act385 conflicts slightly with this statute. It author-
izes regulations that require banks to verify the identity of their custom-
es.3 8 6 For customers who are entities, the bank may Tequire documents that
prove the existence of the entity, such as a trust instrument. 387 A trust certi-
fication may not provide sufficient information and thus the bank would
seemingly have the right to examine the trust instrument.
XIII. ARTICLE 1 I-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The most important Article 11 sections are the effective date and retro-
activity sections. The Arkansas Trust Code takes effect on September 1,
2005.388 ATC Section 1105389 (UTC Section 1106) renders the ATC retroac-
383. UTC § 813 cmt.
384. ATC § 28-73-813.
385. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318
(2003) and in scattered sections of the United States Code).
386. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2004).
387. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121(b)(2)(ii)(A)(2).
388. ATC § 28-73-1104.
389. This section reads as follows;
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, on September 1, 2005:
(1) this chapter applies to all trusts created before, on, or after September 1,
2005;
(2) this chapter applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts com-
menced on or after September 1, 2005;
(3) this chapter applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts com-
menced before September 1, 2005 unless the court finds that application of
a particular provision of this chapter would substantially interfere with the
effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the
parties, in which case the particular provision of this chapter does not apply
and the superseded law applies;
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tive, with a number of limitations on retroactivity. In addition to the excep-
tions listed in section 1105, recall that section 602(a) states that any trust
executed prior to the effective date of the ATC is revocable or irrevocable
under prior law; section 705(d) limits retroactivity with regard to resigna-
tion of trustees; section 8020) with regard to certain aspects of trustee loy-
alty; section 813(e) with regard to the expanded duty to account; and section
1008(c) with regard to exculpatory provisions. In addition, constitutional
limitations will preclude application of the ATC that will change property
rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the ATC's effective
date.39°
The drafters' reason for retroactive application makes sense: "[b]y ap-
plying the Code to preexisting trusts, the need to know two bodies of law
will quickly lessen." Otherwise, particularly in jurisdictions that have abol-
ished the Rule Against Perpetuities, former legislation could continue to live
on for centuries. The Study Committee noted that several Arkansas trust
statutes have applied retroactively,391 with no ill effects. It endorsed the
drafters' reasoning, and agreed with the need to avoid having to learn two
sets of rules, as was the case after the enactment of the Arkansas Business
Corporation Act of 1987.392
This section has not been particularly controversial--only Wyoming
has chosen to omit the entire retroactivity subsection. Yet the retroactive
nature of the ATC may raise questions for the courts. In general, the legisla-
ture has the power to enact statutes that apply retroactively.393 However,
such statutes are unconstitutional to the extent that they violate due process
by disturbing vested or contractual rights.394 Unfortunately, neither the fed-
eral nor the state constitutions define "vested rights., 395 This retroactivity of
(4) any rule of construction or presumption provided in this chapter applies
to trust instruments executed before September 1, 2005, unless there is a
clear indication of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
(5) an act done before September 1, 2005 is not affected by this chapter.
(b) If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a pre-
scribed period that has commenced to run under any other statute before Sep-
tember 1, 2005, that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been re-
pealed or superseded.
ATC § 28-73-1105.
390. UTC § 1105 cmt.
391. Such as the statutes on trust modification, revocation, and termination, Ark. Acts
1989, No. 841, § 4; on trust division, ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-69-706 (LEXIS 2004); the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act id. § 23-51-210 (LEXIS 2000); and the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, id. § 28-70-605 (LexisNexis 2004).
392. Letter from Tom Womack, supra note 167.
393. Ark. Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 209, 866 S.W.2d 823, 824
(1993).
394. Id. at 210, 866 S.W.2d at 824.
395. Id., 866 S.W.2d at 824,
[Vol. 27
ARKANSAS TRUST CODE
the UTC is the subject of a law review article discussing its possible effect
on Nebraska law.3 96 In their conclusion, the authors list key sections of the
UTC with regard to concerns about retroactivity: 411 (c), 412(a), 413(a) and
(b), 503(b), 504(c) and 814(b)(1). 97 Arkansas's modifications to the ATC
have eliminated concerns with respect to 411 (c), 503(b), and 504(c).
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Trust Code is a much-needed statute that will fill signifi-
cant gaps in current Arkansas law. Its few mandatory rules allow drafters a
great deal of freedom, yet it provides a workable, well-thought-out frame-
work of default rules. The ATC represents a major step forward in the im-
provement of Arkansas trust law.
APPENDIX: CURRENT ARKANSAS TRUST STATUTES
THE ARKANSAS TRUST INSTITUTIONS ACT, INCLUDING THE UNIFORM
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT.395
This statute is an amalgam of two acts. The Arkansas Trust Institutions
Act applies to depository institutions, state banks and trust companies. It
regulates the establishment, operation and termination of state trust compa-
nies, provides for the exemption of private trust companies from the chapter
if certain conditions are met, lists the types of entities that may serve as fi-
duciaries in Arkansas, and regulates the operation of trust institutions within
this state.
Tacked onto the end like an afterthought is the Uniform Prudent Inves-
tor Act, which will now instead be codified in Title 28 of the Code with the
rest of the trust statutes. Its previous location as part of an act regulating
trust institutions raised the inference that it applied only to trust institutions,
and not to other types of trustees. Nonetheless, the act applied to "trusts
existing on and created after August 1, 1997." Adoption of the ATC will
result in its repeal from Title 23 and addition to Title 28.
396. John M. Gradwohl & William H. Lyons, Constitutional and Other Issues in the
Application of the Nebraska Uniforn Trust Code to Preexisting Trusts, 82 NEB. L. REV. 312,
(2003).
397. Id. at 364.
398. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-51-101-211 (LEXIS 2000) (to be repealed Sept. 1, 2005).
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UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT399
Adopted by the NCCUSL in 1999 and enacted in Arkansas in 2003,
this is "the most comprehensive disclaimer statute ever written. ' '4°° It is not
only comprehensive; it is complex. Unlike the old disclaimer statute, the
new one contains several sections relating to trust law: disclaimer of interest
in property (which includes disclaimers of future interests); disclaimer of
interest by trustee; disclaimer of power of appointment or other power not
held in fiduciary capacity; disclaimer by appointee, object, or taker in de-
fault of exercise of power of appointment; and disclaimer of power held in
fiduciary capacity. Arkansas made only a few minor changes to the uniform
text. The NCCUSL wrote extensive comments to this act with numerous
examples, none of which are currently found in Arkansas's official code.40'
This act is not intended to be affected by the ATC, but it is possible that
some unintended interaction might arise.
UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT 402
This act permits the pour-over of property by a will into a trust, even if
the trust is modified after the execution of the will or funded after the death
of the settlor/testator. It is not affected by the ATC.
MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES
403
These unrelated statutes concern first, the deposit of security for bonds
with fiduciary institutions, and second, Medicaid Qualifying Trusts-trusts
that, despite their name, actually disqualify the beneficiary for Medicaid.
The latter section concerning Medicaid Qualifying Trusts has been partially
superseded by federal law that allows "special needs trusts," and other types
of disability trusts that supplement Medicaid without disqualifying the bene-
ficiary.40 4 These statutes are not affected by the ATC.
THE UNIFORM COMMON TRUST FUND ACT
415
This uniform act, adopted in 34 jurisdictions, was enacted by Arkansas
in 1947, although Arkansas made substantial changes in the text of the uni-
399. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-101-220 (LEXIS 2004).
400. UNiF. DiSCLAIMER oi. PpoBRTTY INTEREsTs ACT, prefatory note (2003).
401. See supra note 6.
402. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-27-101-106 (LEXIS 2004).
403. Id. §§ 28-69-101-28-69-102.
404. See generally discussion supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
405. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-69-201-207 (LEXIS 2004).
[Vol. 27
ARKANSAS TRUST CODE
form law. The act allows banks and trust companies to pool the trust prop-
erty of different trusts in order to diversify investments. It is not affected by
the adoption of the ATC.
FIDUCIARY POWERS ACT OF 1961406
This act lists powers that may be incorporated by reference into a will
or trust for the benefit of the executor or trustee. It is unaffected by the
adoption of the ATC, although there is some overlap.4 °7
REVOCATION, MODIFICATION, AND TERMINATION OF TRUSTS
40 8
This act is discussed above with relation to Article 4 of the ATC
40 9
UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT
410
This uniform act has been adopted in 47 jurisdictions, and was enacted
by Arkansas in 1992. It concerns trustees of endowment funds at charitable
institutions, chiefly colleges and universities, and provides a standard of
"prudent use of appreciation" of invested funds, as well as authority to dele-
gate investment, release restrictions on use of funds, and a standard of care
for governing boards. This act is not affected by the ATC.
TRUSTEE DIVISION OF TRUSTS ACT4 l
This act provides trustees with authority to divide trusts if division is in
the best interests of beneficiaries or could result in a significant tax savings.
The ATC gives trustees the power to either divide or combine trusts for the
412
same purposes.
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
4 13
This act was adopted in 1997 by the NCCUSL 414 and enacted in 1999
by Arkansas. The commentary, currently unavailable in the official Arkan-
406. Id. §§ 28-69-301-305 (LEXIS 2004).
407. See generally discussion supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
408. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-69-401-403 (LEXIS 2004).
409. See generally discussion supra notes 151-76 and accompanying text.
4XC. ARK. CoD ANN. §§ 2S-69-601--611 (LEX1S 2W4).
411. Id. §§ 28-69-701-706.
412. See generally discussion supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
413. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-70-101-605 (LEXIS 2004).
414. The original Uniform Principal and Income Act was adopted in 1931 by the NC-
CUSL, and the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act in 1962.
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sas code,4 15 explains that the new act has several purposes: first, to regulate
the disposition of income accrued during the probate process; second, to
clarify what is income, to be distributed to income beneficiaries, and what is
principal, to be held and distributed at the termination of the trust to the
remainder beneficiaries; and third, when an income interest ends, to clarify
who will get the income received but not yet distributed, or due but not yet
collected, or accrued but not yet due. Together with the ATC and the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act, these three acts form a comprehensive body of
trust law for Arkansas.
INVESTMENT OF TRUST FUNDS ACT4 16
This statute was adopted in 1955 to broaden the investment power of
trustees. Section 28-71-105 originally contained the "prudent man rule" for
investments, but when the Uniform Prudent Investor Act was adopted in
1993, the prudent man rule was changed to the "prudent investor rule" and
limited to situations where the Uniform Prudent Investor Act does not ap-
ply.
TRUSTEES FOR MISSING PERSONS4 17
These sections require circuit courts to appoint trustees for the estates
of missing persons or persons imprisoned in foreign countries.
PUBLIC TRUSTS
418
These statutes concern the regulation of express trusts in which the
state, or any subdivision or municipal subdivision of it, is the beneficiary,
and the trust's purpose is aiding or furthering lawful functions of the benefi-
ciary. With regard to the ATC, the public trusts statute says that if the trust
doesn't contain the term, the general laws of the state shall control. 419 How-
ever, the ATC exempts these types of trusts from its coverage.42°
415. See supra note 6.
416. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-71-101-107 (LEXIS 2004).
417. Id. §§ 28-72-101-104 (LEXIS 2004).
418. Id. §§ 28-72-201-207.
419. Id. § 28-72-203.
420. See generally discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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MISCELLANEOUS CHARITABLE TRUST STATUTES
42 1
These statutes amend certain charitable trusts by operation of law and
concern exclusions from federal income tax.
ARKANSAS CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT
422
This uniform act allows for the creation of a statutory custodial trust
for adults-the adult version of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The
act contemplates a beneficiary who is not very affluent or sophisticated, not
employing a specialized estate planning attorney. Such a trust will protect
the beneficiary from the "perils" of future incapacity without the necessity
of a conservatorship. This act is unaffected by the ATC.
ARKANSAS LONG-TERM INTERGENERATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1995423
This statute allows the establishment of a trust whose beneficiary is
under eighteen years of age. Beneficiaries cannot receive any type of distri-
butions of the trust until the beneficiary reaches the age of 55. Contributions
may not exceed $4,000 per year, and the trust receives tax deferment until
the time of distribution. This act is unaffected by the ATC.
421. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-72-301-302 (LEXIS 2004).
422. Id. §§ 28-72-401-422.
423. Id. §§ 28-72-501-507.
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